THE WORLD BANK AND CHINESE MILITARY

Ignorance -- Incompetence -- or Cover-Up?
April 4, 1996

Caption: The Corps' Militia Spirit and Military Purpose. The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Agricultural 1st Division looks seriously upon militia construction. Each year (it) allocates special funds and organizes the militia to carry out many types of training exercises. In the assessment of higher organizations, it regularly earns outstanding results. Source: National Defense (Guofang), November 1995, a publication of the Central Military Commission; back page of front cover.

SECTION 1 - THE CORPS MILITARY FUNCTION

background
On October 23, 1995, the Laogai Research Foundation raised a number of questions about World Bank activities in China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region. The report dealt specifically with the Tarim River Basin Project and our concerns that the project may have benefited numerous Laogai camps in the region as well as the quasi-military Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps ("XPCC" or "Corps") and not primarily Uygyr peasants, the intended beneficiaries.
In response to our report, the World Bank dispatched an "Investigative Mission" to Xinjiang from November 5 - 18, 1995. Made up of Bank officials rather than independent persons, the Mission reported its findings on December 20, 1995 during a press conference at World Bank headquarters.
The Bank took the opportunity to report on what it purported to be all of its other Xinjiang projects and further claimed it had conducted an internal review of all Bank projects in China. Nor surprisingly, they cleansed themselves and their projects of any taint of military or forced labor involvement.
The report of its "Investigative Mission" dealt at length with a Bank program known as the "Xinjiang Agricultural Development Project." This project, on which the World Bank spent $77 million was 100% administered by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). It started in fiscal 1987 and was completed in December, 1994. The Bank also reports that the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project, which was approved in February 1992 and is ongoing, has a Xinjiang component ($16 million - IDA). The project is on Production and Construction Corps farms.

WORLD BANK EXPLANATION OF THE XPCC

The report of the "Investigative Mission" refers to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps as the "Xinjiang State Farms Organization." They present a two-page explanation purporting to be a history of the Corps. This history makes no mention of the Corps' current military functions. (See pages 7 and 8).
On page 9 in item 28 of "Findings of the Investigative Mission to Xinjiang" (hereafter referred to a "Findings") the Bank makes its clearest statement concerning Corps links to the Chinese military:
"As for the two projects where the Xinjiang state farms organization had implementation responsibilities, the mission was assured that the functions of this organization had no relation to the People's Liberation Army. The continued use of military terms to describe levels in the organizational structure (commander, regiment, etc.) was attributed to the origins and heritage of the Corps and its members, many of whom are second and third generation of the first military personnel decommissioned in Xinjiang in the early 1950's. The mission found no evidence to confirm or contradict this strong assurance."
In other words, the World Bank relied upon assurances and information from the Chinese government that the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps has no military functions. They accepted and repeated the Chinese government assertion that the Corps' name and organizational structure is a quaint throwback to the Corps' origins of the 1950's maintained for the nostalgic benefit of relatives of original Corps members. Then, in an effort to wash their hands of the mess, and deflect responsibility from themselves, Bank officials say they could neither "confirm or contradict" these Chinese government assurances.

SOME FACTS WHICH CONTRADICT CHINESE ASSURANCES TO THE WORLD BANK THAT THE XPCC HAS NO MILITARY FUNCTIONS

-- The XPCC's 3rd Division, 41st Regiment militia joined main force People Liberation Army and People's Armed Police Units in putting down a Uygur "rebellion" in April, 1990 in the county of Baren near the city of Kashgar.
Source: April 26, 1990 issue of Xinjiang Military
Reclamation, the XPCC newspaper.
--The XPCC militia was used in the Spring of 1989 in coordination with main foce units of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police in handling "disturbances" in Urumqi held to show unity with pro-democracy protesters in Beijing.
Source: January 9, 1989 issue of Xinjina Military
Reclamation, the XPCC newspaper.
-- "Along the 5,400 km long border line in Xinjiang, the Corps keeps guard over 2,109 km of open borderland, with 58 agricultural and husbandry regiments, alternately working the land, and serving as border defense. They are not on the payroll as 'professional armed troops'."
Source: December, 1995 issue of Northwestern Militia.
--"The weapons of the militia of the XPCC are of a large quantity, are dispersed widely, and are comprised of many types.... These last few years, under the attentive eye of the General Staff Department (note:PLA), the Lanzhou Military Region, the Xinjiang Military District and the Corps Party Committee, the Corps' Military Affairs Department spent a great deal of effort in militia weapons depot construction."
Source: September, 1995 issue of Northwestern Militia.
-- The U.S. Department of Defense follows the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps as a military organization, including the names and titled of its key commanders in an official publication.
Source: Directory of P.R.C. Military Personalities,
October 1995, Defense Liaison Office, U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong.
-- On February 3, 1994 Fu Bingyao, deputy commander of the Lanzhou Military Region and concurrently commander of the Xinjiang Military District visited the Corps. Jin Yunhui, the commander of the Corps was quoted during the visit as saying: "In the new year we will beef up militia reservists for the corps so as to make new contributions to bolstering defense reserve forces and maintaining border security and social stability in the autonomous region."
Source: BBC Monitoring Service, February 28, 1994
-- On October 1, 1995, Chinese Vice-Premier Jiang Chunyun made a special visit to Xinjiang army units to congratulate them on "opposing separatism" in the province. He was quoted in the Xinhua dispatch as saying: "Practice shows that the officers and men of the PLA units and the armed police forces, the cadres and policemen of the public security front, and the staff and workers of the Corps are worthy of heroic rank as well as a rank that the party and the people can completely trust."
Source: BBC Monitoring Service, October 10, 1995

THE BAREN UPRISING

There is perhaps no better example of the unique quasi-military and police functions of the Xinjiang Procudtion and Construction Corps than its participation in what has become known as the "Baren Uprising".
Baren is a Uygur county located outside of the city of Kashgar in Xinjiang. On April 4-6, 1990, an estimate 2000 Uygur peasants staged a demonstration in a village square to protest the closing of the mosques in the area. According to Amnesty International (Secret Violence in Xinjiang, October 10, 1992) "unofficial sources" reported that 50 Uygur demonstrators were killed when People's Liberation Army units were sent in to put down the protests.
China immediately restricted the area, keeping journalists and tourists out. They imposed a reasonably effective news blackout preventing the world from learning what really happened in the initial days of violence, and the dragnet which followed.
The Chinese government reported 22 people died. Uygur sources have informed the Laogai Research Foundation that 35 protesters were killed at the scene of the protest, another 30 were killed while being pursued in areas removed from the site, and another 60 were murdered during the period immediately after the protest until late May when the manhunt for Uygur activists trailed off. These sources also claim that from April 1990 to December, 1992 over 500 peasants were arrested and 120 were executed. Appendix 1 contains photographs and brief captions about some of those killed, executed, and thrown into the Laogai for their protest activities. We believe this is the first time their photos have been published.
The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps forces played a direct role in coordination with the PLA and the People's Armed Police in ending the demonstrations and arresting the Uygur protesters.
Amnesty, in a footnote in its report, mentions that "armed groups from the nominally civilian (emphasis added) Production and Construction Brigades (Shengchan Jianshe Dui)" participated in quelling the demonstrations. The source of their information is unclear.
The Laogai Research Foundation found that the April 26, 1990 issue of Xinjiang Military Reclamation, the XPCC newspaper (see Appendix 2 for original Chinese) reported the following on Baren (emphasis is added):
"Headquarters demanded that the militia of the Agricultural 3rd Division assemble in six hours in Sule County.... the militia of the 41st Regiment, which stands 21 km from Kashgar city, as soon as they heard the order, ran to assemble together....by eight o'clock in the morning, the militia of the Agricultural 3rd Division arrived at Baren village on time.... In the struggle over two days and two nights, the militia of the XPCC caught fourteen rioters.... (the rioters) called out from the midst of the crowd, 'We Don't Trust Socialism,' 'We Must Oppose Socialism', 'Outside the Country People Support Us, Inside the Country People Also Support Us'.... The organization numbered about 200.... Their goals were to capture Baren village, enlarge their possessions, and establish an "East Turkestan Republic."
Uygur sources have told us that the XPCC troops were also used in the manhunts which followed the "uprising" and manned roadblocks on many surrounding roads in an effort to prevent people from escaping the area.

1989 PRO-DEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATIONS AND THE XPCC MILITIARY

The Spring of 1989 saw demonstrations not only at Tiananmen Square in Beijing but throughout the country, including in Xinjiang's capital of Urumqi.
An unknown number of protesters took to the streets in Urumqi in what Xinjiang newspapers call the "May 19th Incident." Like in Tiananmen Square in Beijing and other cities in China, the people's Liberation Army and People's Armed Police main force units were used to suppress the demonstrations. But, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps forces also played a significant role.
An article in the January 9, 1990 issue of the Xinjiang Military Reclamation, the XPCC newspaper (see Appendix 3 for original Chinese), reported (emphasis added):
"In the course of Spring last year during the counter-revolutionary chaos that occurred in Beijing, the Corps enlarged its staunch militia position and...threw itself wholly into the struggle to oppose chaos and prevent riot. After the May 19th disturbance occurred, the Corps' People's Armed Forces Department immediately created 'Anti-Riot' Headquarters, organized 511 militia anti-riot and rapid-reaction companies, mobilized 19,554 men...and stationed them in 203 important points...The 61st and 62nd Regiments located in the border regions organized their militia to be on 24 hour guard to safeguard border security."
We do not believe the Baren and 1989 protests were the only times the Productions and Construction Corps forces were used along with the Army and Armed Police to put down protests by minority peoples.. And, we believe they will be used again in the future.
The BBC Monitoring Service on October 10, 1995 published the Chinese news report which indicates our fears are justified.
On October 1, 1995, Chinese Vice-Premier Jiang Chunyun made a special visit to Xinjiang army units to congratulate them on 'opposing separatism' in the province. He was quoted in a Xinhua dispatch as saying: "Practice shows that the officers and men of the PLA units and the armed police forces, the cadres and policemen of the public security front, and the staff and workers of the Corps are worthy of heroic ranks as well as the rank that the party and people can completely trust."
The role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps troops in controlling the minority people's in the province is not a quaint historical throwback. It is ongoing and important. The Corps is a Han Chinese enclave among the distrusted minority peoples, who still, despite government-sponsored Chinese migration programs, are a majority of the population in Xinjiang.

THE XPCC'S BORDER DEFENSE ROLE

From its origins the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps has had a role in defending China's northwestern border with the former Soviet Union.
Xinjiang is an area of great strategic sensitivity. It borders on countries such as India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, and Russia among others. At Lop Nor the Chinese conduct their underground nuclear tests, and other remote areas serve as missile test ranges.
The Chinese government's objective in the area is to control the approximately nine (9) minority peoples in the area, most of whom are Muslims and many of whom would prefer to be self-governing, if not completely independent of China. The largest minority are the Uygurs, but there are twelve other nationalities, including Kazaks, Hui, and Mongols.
The World Bank takes a benign view of the Production and Construction Corps, preferring to focus on its industrial and agricultural role in the areas's economy. In reality, the Corps which is 88.2% Han Chinese (1993 XPCC statistic), is a key element in a complex array of military and quasi-military organizations committed to border defense. Also, as Han Chinese they are "dependable" in a crisis, whereas the minority peoples might join with potential "invaders." The World Bank, in its Investigative Report, completely ignores the Corps' border defense duties.
Furthermore, the Bank's Report writers attach themselves to the false notion that the Corps' military role has been consigned to the scrap heap of history. In other words, they imply -- it may have been true before, but not today.

CHINESE LEADERS PRAISE CORPS BORDER DEFENSE ROLE

The Laogai Research Foundation has discovered in its research of Chinese sources that the Xinjiang Production and Constructions Corps has had a continuous, and strategically integral role in border defense.
The Chinese government time and time again through the years in official publications focuses considerable attention on a fuller view of the unique role the Production and Construction Corps plays in Xinjiang.
For instance, on December 3, 1981, following a visit to Xinjiang by Deng Xiaoping, a directive by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, State Council and the Central Military Commission was issued concerning the XPCC. The directive stated in part:
"The XPCC role in reclamation, the development of reclamation enterprises, the development of the economy of the minority groups, cultural construction, the defense against hegemonism, and the safeguarding of the borders, are of utmost importance." (Xinjiang radio broadcast, June 2, 1982 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).)
PLA General Wang Zhen (who founded the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps and later became a Vice-President of China) in a speech celebrating the XPCC on June 2, 1982 said;
"The XPCC is a great production army. It is an organized and trained powerful army reserve force guarding Xinjiang." (FBIS, June 1982.)
The World Bank Staff Appraisal Report on the Xinjiang Agricultural Development Project is dated February 3, 1987. It never once uses the name Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in its text. It, of course, also fails to mention the military and border defense role of the Corps.

XPCC PUBLICATIONS REPEATEDLY CITE BORDER DEFENSE ROLE

The XPCC itself was not so hesitant. In an article entitled "The Production and Construction Corps is a Force for Strengthening the Unity of the Motherland" published in the November/December 1986 (p.59) issue of a Corps magazine, Xinjiang Agriculture and Reclamation Economy (Xinjinag Nongken Jingji), the author Wang Yuanhua boasts about the Corps' military capabilities (emphasis added):
"Of course, in the 1960's with the counterattack of the Indian invasion and the settling of the Yi-Ta Incident, the Corps was able to splendidly fulfill its great obligation to the motherland and the people. (It) not only has a rich material base, but it also has suitable military qualities: to serve as support forces for the People's Liberation Army; to be able to immediately rise up when called; to fight when risen; and to win when fighting. At the same time, when the motherland is needy, if it needs grain, it has grain; if it needs men, it has men... According to the demands of modern warfare, it has planned studies to master the many types of military skills like reconnaissance, gas defenses and communication to maintain and foster the Corps' superior way of life and raise the staff's political and military qualities... We firmly believe, through economic reform the reclamation and garrison undertakings of the Production and Construction Corps surely will reach advanced development."
Following the "Baren Uprising" the them Commander of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Liu Shuanquan wrote an article in Xinjiang Military Reclamation (April 24, 1990) about the Corps border defense role:
"The XPCC militia is an important power in maintaining Xinjiang's stability and unity and strong reserve forces for the PLA border defenses (emphasis added).... In 1962, the midst of battles along the Chinese-Indian border, the Corps provided reserve forces and greatly supported the front line troops....and following the "Yi-Ta Incident", the militia...successfully created 58 borderline farms...to protect the country's sovereignty and border stability."

RECENT LANZHOU MILITARY REGION MONTHLY MAGAZINE CITES CORPS

The December 1995 issue of Northwestern Militia (published the same month the World Bank published Chinese assurances that the XPCC has no military role) reports:
"Along the 5,400 km long border in Xinjiang, the Corps keeps guard over 2,109 km of open borderland, with 58 agricultural and husbandry regiments, alternately working the land and serving as border defense (emphasis added). They are not on the payroll as 'professional armed troops'."
This article states further that the front-line defense area guarded by the XPCC is 30 kilometers deep.
Northeast of the Kashgar during the Baren uprising the militia of the 1st Agricultural Division conducted "military exercises" as elements of the XPCC 3rd Agricultural Division were in Baren itself. It is assumed that the "exercises" were held to prevent Uygurs in the Tarim Basin from providing any aid to the Baren protesters, and prevent them from launching their own support protests.
Further evidence that the World Bank's view that the Corps no longer has a military or border defense function is nonsense can be found in Chinese government news reports of military meetings held in Xinjiang as well as reports of visiting leaders extolling the Corps role.

NEW CORPS COMMANDER REVEALS SECURITY ROLE FOR HIS TROOPS

On February 4, 1994, Xinjiang Ribao newspaper (BBC Monitoring Service, 2/28/94) reported on a so-called "comfort" visit by officers of the Lanzhou Military Region and the Xinjiang Military District to the regional party committee, regional government and Production and Construction Corps.
The article reports that "Jin Yunhui, deputy secretary of the autonomous regional party committee and commander of the Production and Construction Corps, noted: 'In the new year, we will continued to beef up militia reservists for the corps so as to make new contributions to bolstering defense reserve forces and maintaining border security and social stability (emphasis added) in the autonomous region.'"
The BBC Monitoring Service (7/7/94) also published excerpts of a Xinjiang television broadcast which they entitled: "Xinjiang TV Reports Meeting on 'Better and Stronger' Militia Reserve."
It reads in part: "A meeting called by Lanzhou Military Region to discuss militia reserve service ended in Urumqi yesterday 27th June after five days. Gen. Liu Jingsong and Gen Cao Pensheng, respectively commander and political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region; Abdulaiti Abuderexiti, chairman of the Xinjiang regional government; and Chen Chao, Fu Bingyao, Jin Yunhui and other leaders of the Lanzhou Military Region, the Xinjiang Military District and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps attended the closing session.
The meeting studied ways and means to implement the Central Military Commission's strategic policies for the new period; and to strengthen and improve militia reserve service under conditions of the socialist market economy; as well as future priorities."
General Liu Jingsong then was quoted at length extolling in obligatory fashion the achievements of the militia units.

XPCC ANNIVERSARY REPORT ACKNOWLEDGES 'SPECIAL' CORPS ROLE

A Xinhua domestic dispatch of October 10, 1994 (BBC, 11/1/94) reports on the 40th anniversary celebration of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. One section mentions its history and development into modern times. The audience for the report is Chinese, not international organizations or foreigners. It reads in part:
"In the early 1950's, with the purpose of restoring and developing Xinjiang's economy, maintaining Xinjiang's social stability and consolidating the border defense of the motherland, the central authorities decided to transfer most of the People's Liberation Army PLA men stationed in Xinjiang to civilian work and then organize (the) Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps to execute the historical mission of stationing troops to open up wasteland and garrisoning the frontiers, thus opening a new page in the annals of stationing troops to open up Xinjiang. Through 40 years of construction and development, (the) Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps has become a special political economic, military and social organization (emphasis added) embracing a population of 2.2 m, a large number of corps-run farms and enterprises, and a complete educational, scientific research, cultural and medical system."

CHINA ECONOMIC CZAR PRAISES CORPS BORDER DEFENSE ROLE

Even Zhu Ronji, known in the West as China's "economic czar" does not limit his comments about the Corps to its administrative and economic functions. His visit to Xinjiang from September 8-13, 1995 was chronicled by Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency on September 14th and republished in translation by the BBC on September 25, 1995.
Zhu Ronji, who is also a Vice-Premier and standing committee member of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Political Bureau, "listened to work reports presented by the No. 1 and No. 3 Divisions of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps... He also affirmed the irreplaceable role of the Corps in consolidating border defense, stabilizing the border (emphasis added), foster ethnic unity, and developing regional economy."
It is interesting to note that the Corps border defense role along with its "ethnic unity" duties, not its economic role, were considered primary for the Chinese audience of this dispatch.
Two years before, on September 23-28, Zu Rongji had made another tour of Xinjiang. The Xinjiang People's Radio Network broadcast an account (FBIS, September 30, 1993) which reported:
"Comrade Zhu Rongji fully affirmed the work of Xinjiang Autonomous Regional CPC Committee and People's Government, and Xinjiang's economic construction achievements since reform and opening up, as well as the contributions made by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in defending and building the border areas (emphasis added)."

CORPS WEAPONS DEPOTS

According to Chinese military publications the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps maintains weapons depots throughout the region.
For instance, in the September 1995 issue of Northwestern Militia the following is reported:
"The weapons of the militia of the XPCC are of a large quantity, are dispersed widely, and are comprised of many types... In the last few years, under the attentive eye of the General Staff Department (note: PLA), the Lanzhou Military Region, the Xinjiang Military District, and the Corp's Party Committee, the Corp's Military Affairs Department spent a great deal of effort in militia weapons depot construction."
A news short in the October 1995 issue of National Defense (Guofang), which is a publication of the Central Military Commission, states that the Agricultural 5th Division is one of the three Production and Construction Corps divisions which implemented the World Bank's Xinjiang Agricultural Development Project.
An article in the September 1995 issue of Northwestern Militia provides details about the XPCC's 1st Division efforts. It states:
"The work of the Party Committee and the leaders of the XPCC Agricultural 1st Division closely revolves around border stability. Over six years it has invested Y5.1 million to strengthen militia grassroots work, and received Xinjiang Military District affirmation.... (It) altogether invested Y1.67 million to construct 16 standard weapons depots....(and) invested Y1.3 million on buying 18,000 sets of militia training uniforms."
U.S. Defense Department Considers Corps a Military Organization
The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) considered in 1984 the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps as being a "paramilitary organization under joint government, party, and military control which has the missions of land reclamation, agricultural production, and economic development in remote and unproductive frontier areas, and border defense." (Unclassified DIA publication DDB-2680-32-84; Handbook of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, November 1984, page 22.)
After briefly reviewing the history of the Corps, the text ends with the following statement:
The PPC plays a significant role for the CPLA (note: Chinese People's Liberation Army), providing food and logistical support to local units in remote frontier areas. The PCC's armed basic militia units also serve as border defense forces and probably would be more militarily effective than most regular militia units in time of war." (DIA, pages 22 and 23).
A measure of the Pentagon's continuing interest in the XPCC is that twenty (20) leaders of the Corps are listed in the "Directory of P.R.C. Military Personalities," published in October 1995 by the Defense Liaison Office, U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong. This is the only known unclassified publication containing PLA Order of Battle information, and is published annually.
In this 326 page book listing thousands of Chinese military officers, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps leaders are found in the Xinjiang Military District subsections within the section on the Lanzhou Military Region (pages 134 and 135; see Appendix 4).
Jin Yunhui the Commander of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps is listed as also serving as Deputy Secretary of the Xinjiang Regional Party Committee, and as Deputy Secretary of the Army Party Committee.
The Political Commissar of the XPCC, Wang Chuanyou is listed as a Standing Committee Member of the Xinjiang Regional Party Committee, and Secretary of the Army Party Committee. Other reliable military sources tell the Laogai Research Foundation that Wang Chuanyou is a former PLA Major General who served as the Political Commissar of the COSTIND Satellite Launch Center in Xichang.
There are only two Secretaries of the Xinjiang Army Party Committee listed in the book. One is Wang Chuanyou, and the other is Lieutenant General Pan Zhaomin, the Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military District, who also serves as the Deputy Political Commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region.
The First Secretary of the Army Party Committee is Wang Lequan, the First Political Commissar of the Xinjiang Military District.
Japanese Also Follow the XPCC As a Military Force
The Americans are not the only people listing Corps leaders among their military superiors.
A Japanese publication entitled "China Directory" (Radiopress, Inc., 1995) lists the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps within a section of Lanzhou Military Region. Some eleven (11) Corps Commanders, Deputies, and Political Commissars are listed (page 205).
XPCC Yearbooks Lists Ranks of Military Affairs Officers
The 1991 XPCC Yearbook (pages 46 and 51) states that on June 7, 1990 the Central Military Commission allowed the Corps to change the name of its People's Armed Forces Department to the "Military Affairs Department". This name change included an entirely new leadership team, all of whom are named. Four of those appointed hold the rank of Senior Colonel, and another just Colonel.

THE WORLD BANK AVOIDS USING THE XPCC'S REAL NAME

The World Bank, in its Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) for the Xinjiang Agricultural Development Project, refers to the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps as the Xinjiang Agricultural, Industry and Trade Corporation (XAITC or AITC). It never refers to it as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC).
In its "Findings of an Investigative Mission to Xinjiang" the Bank also refers to such entities as the Bole State Farm instead of Agricultural 5th Division. It never uses the term division or regiment.
The writers of "Findings" (page 7) in reference to the Xinjiang State Farms Organization state: "This organization has historically been referred to itself most frequently as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, commonly shortened to 'the Corps ('bingtuan' in Chines).... By the time of the preparation of the Xinjiang Agricultural Development Project in 1985-6, the Corps had acquired another identity as the Xinjiang Agriculture, Industry and Trade Corporation (XAITX).... The two names Corps and XAITC, refer to the same entity, referred to elsewhere in this report as the "Xinjiang state farms organization'."
It is possible that Westerners working for the World Bank who do not read Chinese do not understand the Chinese policy of using two names for some of their more sensitive installations and organizations. Those, who read Chinese, and have visited the Corps headquarters, have no such excuse. The practice of using two names is common, for instance, in the Laogai or forced labor camp system. The Chinese employees of the World Bank, placed there by the PRC government, should know this. Whether or not they advised their Western colleagues of this is not known.

TWO NAMES -- ONE PLACE

In Appendix 5 we have juxtaposed two photographs which make the name point.
The top photo is of the front gate of the XPCC Headquarters in Urumqi. The name sign on the left says Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and the one on the right (somewhat awkwardly): Xinjiang Agricultural Reclamation Agriculture, Industry and Trade United Enterprise Corporation.
The bottom photo is of the front gate of a Laogai camp. The inside left signboard says: Shanghai Municipality Baimaoling Farm and the one on the right: Shanghai Municipality No. 2 Laogai General Brigade.
A brief paragraph in the 1989 XPCC Yearbook (page 101) provides some insight into Chinese government official thinking about names and foreigners:
"For use in outward development work, in September 1988 by Corps decision, the First Engineering Division changed its name for use with outsiders to the Corps Architecture, Installation, and Engineering General Company.... Division Commanders, Regiment Commanders, and Political Commissars are to be called General Managers, Managers, and Secretaries to outsiders."
The World Bank Accepts Chinese "Assurances" - Doesn't Check Them
In "Findings" on page 9, the Bank says it was "assured" by unnamed Chinese authorities that "the functions of this organization (note: meaning the Corps units involved in the Bank's projects) had no relation to the People's Liberation Army. The continued use of military terms to describe levels in the organizational structure (commander, regiment, etc.) was attributed to the origins and heritage of the Corps and its members, many of whom are second and third generations of the first military personnel decommissioned in Xinjiang in the early 1950's. The mission found no evidence to confirm or contradict this strong assurance."
This passage is perhaps the most important in "Findings." The Bank appears to narrow the discussion to the three Production and Construction Corps divisions involved in these "two" Bank projects. Implicit in this is the concession that other Corps units may have a relationship with the PLA.
But this is a generous reading of the Bank's intent, for in the next sentence, the Bank repeats the Chinese government assertion that the only reason the XPCC is referred to as the Corps is out of respect for its "origins and heritage." And, in their press release (page 2) the Bank states clearly:
"No administrative relationship was found between the Xinjiang State Farms Organization and the military (emphasis added), as alleged. Assurances of this were provided by central authorities as well as officials of Xinjiang State Farms. Observations by the mission, and by dozens of previous Bank missions to Xinjiang, are that the population under Xinjiang State Farms is predominantly civilian farmers and enterprise workers and their families, not soldiers or prisoners."
The statement that "The mission found no evidence to confirm or contradict this strong assurance" contains within it the implication that the World Bank team actively sought such evidence, but simply could not find any. The Laogai Research Foundation does not believe the World Bank staff looked very hard for evidence, if they looked at all. If the World Bank had expended even a small fraction of its intellectual and financial resources on a survey of Chinese military publications and those of the Corps, they would have found at least as much evidence as the Laogai Research Foundation has presented in this report.
Did the World Bank Ignore Evidence Available in the 1980's?
There is also a serious question about how much evidence the World Bank staff gathered about the XPCC when it was preparing the project for approval.
For instance, the Staff Approval Report (SAR) for the Xinjiang Agricultural Development Project states that the XAITC has 171 state farms (page 5). The preappraisal mission for the project was conducted in September,1985, and the appraisal mission in June, 1986.
On September 2, 1985 Xinhua published a short dispatch in English which the BBC Monitoring Service re-published on September 11, 1985 and titled: "Family Farms on Xinjiang Reclaimed Land." The report discussed a project undertaken by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. The last statement of the news item reads: "The 171 state farms under the corps (sic) are considered semi-military organizations." (emphasis added).
We believe the World Bank has accepted Chinese lies and repeated them to the world in "Findings," and probably knew that the organization they had agreed would implement the Xinjiang Agricultural Development Project was the quasi-military Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
The Chinese offered the Bank a convenient evasion by referring to the Corps as the Xinjiang Agriculture, Industry and Trade Corporation, and the Bank accepted it. If the World Bank did not view the name Production and Construction Corps, and the Corps role in Xinjiang as politically sensitive they would not have waited until the Laogai Research Foundation raised the issue before acknowledging the existence of the name. The SAR itself while full of detailed information about the "XAITC" economic structure and agricultural output statistics is devoid of information about the Corps history and ongoing role as a reserve force for the PLA, and its border defense duties.
The Bank Knows the Corps is Special
The closest the Bank comes to acknowledging the special role of the Corps is on page 5 when it writes:
"Of the four directly-managed AITCs, Xinjiang has a unique relationship -- termed 'direct affiliation' -- with the BSF (note: Bureau of State Farms) whereby, for historical reasons related to strategic location and the sizable minority population, appointments of all provincial state farm personnel are made by the Central Government."
The Bank also fails to mention in the SAR the unique and substantial role the Corps plays in operating forced labor camps in Xinjiang.

THE WORLD BANK - THE CORPS - AND THE LAOGAI

The World Bank in "Finding" devotes considerable attention to the Laogai in the area of the Tarim Basin Project, specifically the camp known as Pailou Farm. The Bank maintains this camp is receiving no water from Bank irrigation projects, and prisoners do not harvest cotton in other than Laogai fields. They also apparently visited some areas associated with a camp located at "State Farm No. 7". They cleared themselves concerning this camp as well.
The Laogai Research Foundation will not comment on these findings, except to state that credible evidence can only be discovered by an independent investigation commission operating on a schedule of their own choosing.
Bank Investigators Seek to Minimize the Xinjiang Laogai System
But, "Findings" contains some completely misleading information provided by the Chinese government about the Laogai, and repeated by the Bank.
On page 9 of "Findings" the Bank states: As explained by the Regional Justice Bureau, the prisons and Laogai farms under the Corps are among a limited number (emphasis added) of prisons within the country specifically designated by the Ministry of Justice to handle prisoners performing reform-through-labor."
The Laogai Research Foundation has, over the years, identified over 1,000 Laogai camps in China which are reform-through-labor camps. Many more exist. The Chinese government itself has said repeatedly that the Ministry of Justice operates 685 "prisons" and reform-through-labor facilities throughout the country. This number, which is not in any event the true number of camps in the country, does not include those run by the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
The Bank's use of the term "limited" is, in our view, designed to make the Corps' Laogai appear to be a modest operation intended only for its criminal citizens, rather than an integral part of China's Siberia.
On page 6 of the "Findings" the Bank writes about a "farm" which adjoins the Pailou camp. They state: "On the farm itself, not a single uniform (other than those of two prison police who drove in to escort the mission to the prison), weapon, or fence was seen. No watch tower was seen over the prison walls, which were, however, fairly high (about 20m). Therefore, the mission was of the view that even on State Farm No. 7 of Aksu branch, the Bank project (note: Water Supply and Sanitation) served its intended beneficiaries, who were neither prisoners nor soldiers, but poor transplanted peasants from eastern provinces."
And who might these "poor transplanted peasants from eastern provinces" be?
They are in all likelihood forced-job placement personnel (jiuye) or prisoners who have completed their terms, but who are deemed not to have been "reformed", and prisoners who have been released but are forced to remain in Xinjiang for the rest of their lives.
Legal journals and yearbooks published by both the Production and Construction Corps and the Xinjiang regional government in the 1980's and 90's frequently mention inspection tours of the Xinjiang camps by Laogai officials from places like Shanghai, Shandong and Hebei. They also frequently mention family members visiting prisoners from Beijing and Liaoning.
Harry Wu in 1994 went to the Talimu Laogai and spoke with (and photographed) a duty prisoner guarding the camp's cotton warehouse facility. The prisoner said he was from Shanghai and had been sentenced to a life term. He also claimed to be suffering from stomach cancer.
The XPCC Handles Largest Transfer of Prisoners in Recent Times
The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps in 1986 Yearbook (page 110) refers to "Central Party Document (83)70" which orders the "transfer of a series of prisoners from inland provinces and cities to the XPCC for detention and reform." (See Appendix 6)
The December 1995 issue of Northwestern Militia on page 38 (Appendix 7) gives an account of this decision and the Corps' reaction:
"In the autumn of 1983, the State Council decided that 100,000 prisoners (emphasis added) from Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou were to be sent to the XPCC for detention and labor. The Corps had a shortage of prisons and lacked preventive measures. At that time, according to estimates of the relevant departments of the CCP Central (Committee) in order to accomplish this 'special project', many billions of yuan would be required ....the Corps' policymakers and representatives of the 2.2 million land reclamation warriors voluntarily offered to complete the task for the Central Party leadership. They organized 86 militia squadrons of over 4,000 militia members; and, in one year's time for detention, not one prisoner escaped. The received commendation from the CCP leadership and the regional government."
This decision by the State Council was made at a time when "economic reform" was underway. It was not made under Mao. It was not made during the Cultural Revolution. It was not made during one of the Communist Party's many political campaigns. It was made when Deng Xiaoping was physically healthy and at the height of his political powers.
This movement of prisoners to Xinjiang if the largest transfer known in recent Chinese history. And, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps was the organization chosen to implement the scheme.
The World Bank's "Findings" acknowledge the XPCC's role in operating Laogai camps on behalf of the central government, as well as their own system. But, the Bank seeks to minimize the Corps' importance, and completely avoids the question of why central government camps exist in Xinjiang. The reason is simply that Xinjiang, a remote and harsh land covered by huge deserts, is China's Siberia -- a place of exile from which most prisoners never return.
The 1994 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Yearbook (page 84) indicates that there are at least 5,270 guards (ganjing) in the XPCC Laogai system. It is not known how many XPCC militiamen perform regular duties within the Laogai. A completely accurate estimate of the number of camps and their population is not possible at the moment. But, the Laogai Research Foundation is undertaking a project to do so.

SEEDS PROJECT - MISSING FROM THE BANK'S " INVESTIGATION"

The World Bank attached a "Summary of World Bank Projects in Xinjiang Region" as Annex 2 in "Findings." The annex listed four projects which it represents are the full extent of their involvement in Xinjiang.
One of the projects -- the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project -- involves "six inland provinces, including Xinjiang." Of the total cost of $189 million, Xinjiang involves $24 million in "investment" and $16 million of IDA financing. The Production and Construction Corps is currently implementing the project in Xinjiang.
The Bank represents that these are all the projects that they have had in the past or are in progress. This is not true.
On March 13, 1984 the World Bank issued a Staff Appraisal Report for a $40 million "Seeds Project" in "12 provinces and two autonomous regions (SAR, Credit and Project Summary, no page number). One of those autonomous regions was Xinjiang. The project was approved and implemented.
The SAR states that AITCs in each area would implement the project. In Xinjiang, as we know from "Findings" the AITC is the Production and Construction Corps.
Production and Construction Corps publications confirm that they handled this project.
In the 1991 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps Yearbook there is a full page advertisement for the XPCC Agricultural 1st Division, 9th Regiment (Appendix 8). The regimental commander, Zhou Fangzhong, is pictured in his XPCC uniform. The text provides all sorts of production statistics for the Regiment, and the last paragraph reads:
"The high quality cotton seed plant at the regiment was newly constructed using World Bank funds. The long staple cotton seeds processed at this plant supply a large region in southern Xinjiang."
The 1988 Xinjiang Yearbook, Production and Construction Corps Section (page 672) confirms the World Bank seed project:
"In 1987, two construction projects using World Bank loans were utilized by the Production and Construction Corps - the first is a seed development project with a loan of US$12 million, with domestic involvement of Y18 million, and having a construction period of five years . . . ."
The Agricultural 1st Division of the XPCC operates at least fifteen (15) Laogai camps of Various sizes, all of which are located in the Tarim Basin area. The Tanan Laogai Detachment, run by the XPCC 1st Division, 14 Regiment is one of these. Harry Wu visited this camp in April 1994. The prisoners grow. Except for guards and their families, this is entirely a Laogai camp.
In a booklet entitled: "Studies on Xinjiang Agriculture and Reclamation Economics Problems" (Xinjiang Production and Construction Party Committee Policy Research Office, Xinjiang People's Publisher, 1991) there is a table on page 51. Table 4 is titled: Distribution of Long Staple Cotton Commodity Production Base." It lists eleven (11) XPCC regiments which grow long staple cotton, the 14 Regiment among them. It also lists the 7th, 8th, 10th, 11th 12th and 13th regiments which we have confirmed each have Laogai camps. We believe, although cannot confirm, that Tanan (14) is the largest.
Failure to Include Seed Project is Evidence of Bank Cover-up
The conclusion is inescapable. The XPCC Agricultural 1st Division, 9th Regiment seed processing plant is providing seeds to the Laogai cotton fields as well as to non-Laogai XPCC fields. This is why the World Bank failed to include the "Seeds Project" in "Findings." For if they had included it, the World Bank would not have been able to state as it did that: "No evidence was found of any benefit, direct or indirect, to forced labor camps or military 'special farms.' "
To believe that the XPCC 1st Division is refusing to provide long-staple cotton seeds to its own Laogai cotton fields defies credulity and, above all, common sense.

ONLY AN INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION CAN GET FULL TRUTH

The modest amount of documentation we offer in this report showing the military, police, and forced labor camp role of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps persuades the Laogai Research Foundation to urgently renew its call for an independent international commission to investigate the World Bank's projects in Xinjiang.
The World Bank states in its press release of December 20, 1995 that: "Both the Tarim Basin Project inquiry and the broader Xinjiang and China-wide inquiries were conducted independently of the Chinese government, which cooperated fully with the Bank. The Government also mounted its own investigation in Xinjiang, with a Bank staff member as an observer.
We do not believe the Bank can investigate itself. In fact, we believe that Bank senior staff embarked on a cover-up, and have intentionally misled the World Bank President and the media. The "investigative mission" spent days in the Tarim Basin allegedly visiting its project benefit areas. They said they reviewed all of their projects in Xinjiang. And, yet, they failed to mention the "Seeds Project" which benefited the XPCC and its extensive Laogai cotton camps.
Why they did so can only be answered by an independent international investigation conducted by persons of stature, including persons who speak and read Chinese, and understand things military, but whom are unafraid of either retaliation by the Chinese government or the implications of the truth.
We believe that government agencies in the United States, Russia, and India, at least, have in their possession detailed intelligence about the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. We, of course, do not know if they will share any of it with the public and the media.
We will turn over all of our documentation (which is much more than has been included in this report) to an independent, international investigative team.

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