Separatism And The War On "Terror" In Uyghuristan/ Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
Bu kitapning milliy herkitimiz üchün pütünley paydiliq bolup ketishi natayin, emma paydisi bolmaydu degilimu bolmaydu. Keng kitapxanlarning we bu heqte tetqiqat bilen shughullinidighanlarning ihtiyajini nezerde tutup élan qilindi.Selbiy tereplerni shakal süpitide shalliwétip, ijabiy tereplerdin janliq paydilinishinglarni ümid qilimiz.
-Uyghuristan Redaksiyoni
A Thesis by Davide Giglio for Award of the Certificate of Training in
United Nations Peace Support Operations
Introduction p.2
1. China and Terrorism……………………………………………………p.3
2. Why Xinjiang Matters……………………………………………….….p. 5
3.Background……………………………………………………………….p.6
3.1 Geography
3.2 People
3.3 Economy and resources
3.4 Culture and Religion
3.5 History
Critical Context – a comparison of the protagonists
4. Episodes of Terrorism in Xinjiang………………………………….….p.11
4.1 Explosions
4.2 Assassinations
4.3 Attacks on Police and Government Institutions
4.4 Secret Training and Fundraising
4.5 Plotting and Organizing Disturbances and Riots
4.6 "East Turkistan" terrorist incidents outside China
5. The Separatists: Organizations and Individuals……………………….p.16
5.1 Organisations active in Xinjiang
5.2 Uighur organizations active outside Xinjiang
5.3 Uighur “cyber-separatism”
5.4 Most Wanted
6. China’s counter- terrorist strategy: repression and diplomacy……….p.22
6.1 Domestic measures
6.2 China’s anti-terror diplomacy
6.3 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
Integrative conclusion
7. Xinjiang : radical Islam’s next tinderbox?…………………………..p.25
7.1 Conclusion
7.2 Sources
Introduction
The Chinese central government authority has in recent years been under increasing challenge
from Muslim separatists in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People’s Republic
of China, a vast, landlocked expanse of deserts, mountains and valleys bordering Central Asia.
The ongoing situation in Xinjiang has been receiving increasing attention since China, after the
Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on American soil, has raised the public profile of its campaign against
local Uighur separatism, in the attempt to attract international support and understanding.
Terrorism has emerged as a major security threat for China and a national defense priority for
the People’s Republic of China as indicated in its Defense White Papers. China's Defense 2000 White
Paper had made only sparse and general references to terrorism. The document "China's National
Defense in 2002", instead devoted an entire section to the terror threat. The report identified terrorism
as a top ranking security issue, specifically pointing to the restive Western Xinjiang region, where
separatists want to create an independent "East Turkistan". In portraying China too, as a victim of
terrorism, the White Paper said that "The 'East Turkistan' terrorist forces are a serious threat to the
security of the lives and property of the people of all China's ethnic groups."
Riding the momentum of the US-led global war on terror, China has actively sought to project
its own action vis-‡-vis Muslim separatists as part of the worldwide effort. Terrorist characterization of
the Uighurs pro-independence activities has been criticized in Xinjiang and by human and civil rights
groups worldwide. In both cases it has been alleged that Beijing is using anti-terrorism as an excuse to
stifle dissent in its western-most region. Taking the Uighurs’ cause to heart, human rights activists also
charge that the Chinese government's use of the term “separatism” refers to a broad range of activities
including the exercise of the rights of expression and religion and the native population's desire for
cultural, linguistic and religious autonomy.
On the contrary, if one is to adopt the Chinese central government perspective, the PRC policy
in the region is instead a legitimate response to a genuine threat to the stability of a territory deemed to
be of vital national significance both in its strategic location and in its resource potential. This threat
would be carried out by obscurantist and violent forces, part of an international terrorist movement
aiming at destabilizing Central Asia.
The People’s Republic of China is remarkably engaged in a titanic effort to drag the region out of
the shoals of underdevelopment into which for centuries remoteness, backwardness and geo-political
interests have run Central Asia aground. Xinjiang, with its mineral wealth and its strategic geographic
position should be - of all of Central Asia - uniquely equipped to take full advantage of the current
dizzying pace of economic development promoted by the Chinese authorities.
In this paper I will argue that Beijing’s safest bet in ensuring that the region remains free of
fanatic Islamist violence is to make sure that economic improvements and opportunities are more
evenly distributed. It befalls on the Uighurs as well as to the Chinese to make the best out of the
ongoing development of Xinjiang.
I will further argue that despite the resurgence in recent years of Muslim identity throughout
Central Asia the radical Islamic dimension of Uighur activism in Xinjiang – which has certainly been
on the rise for some time – should not be over-emphasized. Unrest in Xinjiang has been until now
motivated less by Islamic fundamentalism than secular demands. Religion is rather the natural vehicle
of expressing the Uighurs’ growing socio-economic grievances. Beijing has so far been successful in
tackling the interaction of Uighur groups and outside Islamic radicals. There are, however, growing
concerns that the conflict could become more violent as Uighurs combining with external militant
Islamist influences could radicalize their activities in Xinjiang.
The challenge for Beijing is to find a way to contain the influence of the separatist movement
through measures designed to provide genuine autonomy for the Muslims of Xinjiang within the
Chinese constitutional framework. The latest indications however, are that in the near future, the
Chinese government will maintain keep its course with its policy aimed at preserving law and order in
the region .
However framed and viewed, the ultimate outcome of the ongoing struggle in Xinjiang is
uncertain and will much depend on China’s unpredictable political and economic evolution. For the
time being tensions in Xinjiang remain low-level. As the nexus between China, the Greater Middle
East, Central and South Asia and Russia Xinjiang lies at the cultural crossroads between the Islamic
world and the Han Chinese heartland. These factors combine to make the outcome of the separatist
struggle in Xinjiang of growing international strategic importance.
1. China and Terrorism
A paper on the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces issued in January 2002 by the Chinese State
Council Information Office, disclosed that various terrorist activities have been underway in Xinjiang
since the 1950s.†The Chinese government stated that, particularly from 1990 to 2001, the “East
Turkistan” terrorist forces inside and outside Chinese territory were responsible for over 200 terrorist
incidents in Xinjiang, resulting in the deaths of 162 people of all ethnic groups, including grass-roots
officials and religious personnel with injuries to more than 440 people.
Pressure on suspected government opponents intensified in the XUAR soon after 11 September
2001. Official sources made clear that the “struggle against separatism” was wide-ranging. Beijing has
valid reasons to express its condemnation of terrorism. China’s international status has been
relentlessly growing in hand with its extraordinary economic development. The selection of Beijing as
the site for the 2008 Olympic Games reflected the international community's confidence in China's
continuing reform and stability. China's admission to the World Trade Organization demonstrated the
Chinese commitment to embracing and upholding the rules of international trade and investment. It has
been noted that a strong and forceful stand on international terrorism will put China in good stead in the
community of nations. These efforts also help refute accusations, still making the rounds in some U.S.
conservative circles, that China has had “one foot in the terrorists' camp” due to arms’ transfers to
states that harbor or sponsor terrorist groups and organizations .
The Western region of Xinjiang appears to be the main concern and the focus of China’s current
domestic anti-terrorism drive. Since Oct. 2001, Chinese authorities have disclosed an increasing
amount of information about “terrorist” activities in Xinjiang. China has also charged that Xinjiang's
separatists have colluded with al Qa'ida members who allegedly may be seeking refuge in remote
Xinjiang. Indeed, at least twelve Uighurs are known to be among the six hundred suspected al Qa’ida
and Taliban prisoners being held by U.S. forces in the Cuban naval base of Guantanamo.
China alleges that the Uighur separatist movement has been extensively financed by Osama bin
Laden and has direct connections to the al Qa’ida network. In a report released in January 2002, titled
"East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity" , the Chinese government stated
"Bin Laden has schemed with the heads of the Central and West Asian terrorist organizations many
times to help the 'East Turkistan' terrorist forces in Xinjiang launch a 'holy war' ". According to the
report, bin Laden met with the leader of the dangerous separatist organization, the East Turkistan
Islamic Movement (ETIM) in early 1999, and asked him to coordinate with the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Taliban while promising financial aid . In February 2001, the report
continued, bin Laden and the Taliban "decided to allocate a fabulous sum of money for training the
'East Turkistan' terrorists," promised to bear the costs of their operations in 2001, and along with the
Taliban and IMU, "offered them a great deal of arms and ammunition, means of transportation and
telecommunications equipment."
In analyzing the Chinese stance, it has been said that in the US - led war on terror, China has
seized the opportunity to justify its repression of pro-independence activities in Xinjiang by framing the
conflict in that region as just one more front of the global war on terror.
To address the challenge posed by separatism in Xinjiang, China has taken action both at home
and on the international front. Domestically, Chinese authorities have undertaken a number of
measures to improve China’s counter-terrorism posture and national security. These have included
increased vigilance in Xinjiang and higher readiness levels of military and police units in the region.
Action has also been taken to update and give more teeth to anti-terrorism legislation. At the end of
December 2001, China amended the provisions of its Criminal Law with the stated purpose of making
more explicit the measures it already contained to punish “terrorist' crimes”.
On the diplomatic front, the PRC has been active not only in multilateral fora dealing with
terrorism but also within regional security organizations. At this level, the PRC has worked to establish
and develop the security and anti-terrorism components of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) a loose alliance comprising China, Russia and four other Central Asian States . Born in 1996 as
the ‘Shanghai Group’, a body to stabilize and demilitarize shared borders, the SCO, as the organization
has called itself since 2001, has progressively been tasked with a larger agenda starting with the
promotion of regional trade. China has exercised leadership in developing the body’s contents and
structure. While this has been done to make the Group more active in standing against ‘terrorism,
separatism and extremism’, it has been argued that a possible rationale of SCO’s empowerment on
China’s part could also be the reduction of the American increased influence in neighboring Central
Asia.
Beijing had banked on the international community understanding and acceptance of its policy in
Xinjiang in the light of the widely shared anti-terrorism concern post-9/11. Instead, the PRC has been
criticised for band-wagoning in the war on terrorism. Western human rights groups have expressed
increasing concern that the Chinese policy is spreading a wide net criminalizing innocent Uighurs in
addition to the genuine separatist activists.
Despite such criticism, China's efforts have been to an extent successful as, for instance, in the
case of East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which was declared a terrorist organization by the
U.S. Department of State in August 2002. This is important as until then, the United States had
repeatedly rebuked China for human rights violations in Xinjiang and resisted linking the post-
September 11 2001 war on terrorism with Chinese attempts to quash Uighur separatism.
In broad terms, the central Chinese government has so far responded to the challenge posed by
ethnic unrest in Xinjiang with a two-dimensional approach. On one hand, the PRC hopes that Uighur
resistance to Chinese assimilation will be eventually be mollified by the fallout of improved economic
conditions in the region and overwhelmed by Xinjiang’s ‘Sinification’. The central government has
therefore given high momentum to the economic development of Xinjiang as part of the general ‘Go
West’ policy. While the overall results are indeed stunning, intra - regional economic development has
been uneven.
On the other hand, the Chinese government has been showing unrelenting resolve in tackling
separatism. Security tactics and uneven economic development risk therefore to aggravate relations
between Xinjiang's seven million Han, the dominant Chinese ethnic group, and its indigenous eight
million Uighurs. There are also indications of a growing radicalization of Central Asia posing the
credible risk of the contagious spread to Xinjiang of violent Islamic extremism. The collapse of the
Soviet Union and the subsequent independence of several Muslim Soviet republics bordering Xinjiang,
as well as the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in the Greater Middle East, have also contributed to a rise
in terrorist activity in the region. Islamic fundamentalist elements in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the
Middle East have reportedly trained some of the individuals responsible for these attacks.
2. Why Xinjiang Matters
Uighur dissatisfaction over Chinese rule has been a constant thorn in China's side over the past
several decades. China’s current policy, however, suggests a deeper concern for the potential impact
that the Islamic resurgence in the region might have for the country's long-term stability.
The conflict in the province is further complicated by a fluid international context. After decades
of oblivion, Sept. 11 2001 has catapulted Central Asia back to the fore of international attention. The
regional chessboard where Kipling’s nineteenth century ‘Great Game’ was played, is again the theatre
of a renewed power struggle among traditional and new players. The new power entry is America
which, as a result of its 2001 military campaign in Afghanistan, has solidly entrenched itself in the
region.
Central Asia has been extraordinarily agitated since 9/11. This agitation has been spilling over
into Xinjiang with potentially unpredictable consequences for the PRC. The stakes are potentially high
as Beijing is concerned that separatist activities in the country's largest and westernmost province
region, home to some of China's key military posts and rich national resource deposits of oil, minerals
and natural gas, hold the prospect of becoming a significant threat to China's long-term political
stability.
It has been noted that the Uighur Turkic Muslims obviously represent only a fraction of China's
overall population of more than one billion, but given their concentration in a remote border area of
vital strategic concern, their power to threaten Beijing's interests is disproportionate to their numbers .
The importance of the region to Beijing in terms of its economic and strategic potential, helps explain
the central government's response to any unrest in Xinjiang. The priority attached by the Chinese
authorities to their policies in Xinjiang are therefore testament to the relevance of the region to
economic development and overall stability of the country. However, the scale and intensity of Chinese
response risks triggering further anti-regime unrest, heightening the prospect that the Xinjiang crisis
will spiral out of control, destabilizing China.
3. Background
3.1 Geography
Vast but thinly populated, Xinjiang (the name meaning “New Territory”) is China’s largest
region. Situated in the North-West of the country, with an area of 1.6 million sq km, the landlocked
region makes up one-sixteenth of China's territory and borders Russia, four former Soviet Central
Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan), plus Mongolia, Pakistan, and
Afghanistan.
The geographical feature of Xinjiang is commonly referred to as ‘three mountains with two
basins in between”. In the North lies the stretching Altay mountain range and in the south are the grand
Kunlun mountains and the Altun mountains, serving acting as natural barriers. The Tienshan mountains
stand in the middle and divide Xinjiang into northern and southern parts, forming the Junggar basin in
the north and the Tarim basin in the South. The Gurbantunggut desert in the Junggar basin is the
second largest desert in China. It lies next to Taklimakan desert in the Tarim Basin which is the world’s
second largest mobile desert. The climate is typically dry-continental with abundant sunlight, little
precipitation, a sharp contrast between day and night temperatures, and a bitter coldness. In spite of the
presence of such large deserts, Xinjiang does have large rivers, such as the Tarim, the Ili, the Ertix and
the Manas which irrigate the desert oases .
The vast barren expanses of the province have historically provided China with “strategic depth”
from military threats coming from the West. The region’s remoteness made it also a logical choice as
China's nuclear weapons testing site. At site Lop Nor in the north – west part of the Tarim basin at least
forty five nuclear tests are reckoned to have been conducted since 1964 .
3.2 People
The latest Chinese census of 1999 estimated Xinjiang’s population in circa 17.5 million people.
Forty-seven ethnic groups are counted although only thirteen are officially recognized nationalities of
Xinjiang . Besides the Uighurs and the Han, other significant ethnic groups inhabiting the region
include also Kazaks (numbering about one million), Mongolian (around 159.000) Kyrgyz (about
150.000), and Huis, that is the Muslim Chinese Han (700.000). Small communities of Tajiks and
Uzbeks are also counted.
The Kazaks, nomadic pastoralists, arrived in Xinjiang in the mid-1800s when they were pushed
eastward by the expanding Tsarist empire and they particularly inhabit the Ili Prefecture in the North-
West. However, the Uighurs are the single most populous ethnic group, numbering slightly over eight
million. A considerable Uighur diaspora has left Xinjiang over the past decades. There are also some
500,000 Uighurs scattered in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.
Approximately the same number are known to have settled in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Western Europe and the United States. Uighur communities are also settled in other parts of
China as far as Beijing and Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. The activities of the Uighur diaspora
are closely monitored and appear to be of major concern to the Chinese Authorities who fear that
separatists in Xinjiang receive indispensable logistical support from abroad, particularly through the
CARs.
The development, from the 1950s, of mineral resources and the opening up of the region for
cotton production, brought an influx of ethnic Chinese which dramatically altered the province’s ethnic
balance. In 1949, Xinjiang had 3.2 millions Uighurs and only 140,000 Chinese. Now, of the total
population, 40 percent are Han, and only 47 percent are Uighur. Given current migration patterns,
Uighurs fear they might soon be significantly outnumbered. The growth of the Han Chinese population
of Xinjiang has been achieved by flooding the region with massive numbers of Chinese immigrants.
Initially Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang was officially encouraged to support agricultural
development and to promote security with respect to a possible Soviet threat to the lightly populated
territory. Since the 1980s, official support for compulsory migration has been toned down, possibly in
response to increasing tensions with the local populace, but voluntary immigration to Xinjiang has
proceeded apace. In part, this reflects the same kinds of pressures being experienced elsewhere in
China as millions of people flood out of the rural areas to seek work in the growing manufacturing
economy.
This trend is mirrored in the case of the flow of Chinese to Xinjiang by the demand for skilled
workers to fill positions in resource-based extractive industries to supply the raw materials to support
China's booming economic expansion. In what is perceived as a further attempt at ethnic dilution by
national osmosis, China's strict one-child policy has been waived for Han Chinese willing to move to
Xinjiang; they are therefore allowed to have two children, a fringe benefit which encourages further
immigration.
The Han are heavily concentrated in the northern part of Xinjiang, in and around the capital
Urumqui. The southern, less habitable, part of Xinjiang remains dominated by native groups with the
Uighurs being the most important of these. The majority of Uighurs still live in rural areas or the
poorest areas of towns and cities. Many Chinese immigrants have moved into newly constructed
apartments and have taken most of the jobs in new factories and firms.
3.3 Economy and resources
The region is believed to hold some of China’s largest deposits of oil, gas and uranium which,
once all proven and tapped, will be of enormous benefit to the country's economic development
prospects. It has been estimated that China will need to import 21 million tons of oil by 2010 if it is to
maintain its present economic growth rate, and energy security is a major consideration in Beijing's
policy towards the region.
Besides its indigenous mineral resources, the region is central to China’s plans for major
pipelines linking oil and gas fields in the Central Asian republics to the industrial areas and the coastal
cities of China in the east (a gas pipeline joining Xinjiang to Shanghai is in the making). More
importantly, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast energy supplies of the former Soviet
Central Asian republics are becoming a focus of geopolitical attention as regional and extra-regional
states seek to secure access to new sources of oil.
Typically, Han Chinese control the major industries in Xinjiang, and its economic production is
expressly geared to the requirements of the centre. The Muslims largely remain in traditional
agricultural and livestock occupations with comparatively less opportunities for advancement in other
sectors. Most of the region's resources are exported unprocessed to China proper, and are re-imported
as manufactured goods at higher prices.
In an attempt to close the gap in income and wealth terms between the rapidly growing eastern
coastal provinces and the western China 1999 Chinese President Jiang Zemin launched the Western
Development campaign, popularly known as “Go West!”. Tracking it back to Deng Xiao Ping
economic strategy, Jiang’s plan focused on massive infrastructure investment in Xinjiang, Tibet,
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regions, Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Guizhou provinces
and Chonqing municipality – totaling 56% of China’s land area and 23% of the population. The results
in Xinjiang of the campaign show an impressive record of achievement on the part of the Chinese
Authorities. The development of modern infrastructure (highway, railways, telecommunications, etc.)
thanks to sustained investment – both domestic and international - is undeniable.
Although there is some controversy concerning the reliability of Chinese statistics, it is hard to
confute the perception that, in general, living standard in the province are improving year by year.
According to China White Paper on Xinjiang the income of both urban and rural residents is
continuously growing . In 2001, the average annual net income per capita in the rural areas of Xinjiang
was 1,710.44 Yuan (ca 206 US$). The average annual salary of an urban employee was 10,278 Yuan
(ca 1.243 US$). Consumptions are growing and the number of durable consumer goods owned by local
residents is increasing rapidly. The quality of life of local residents has been noticeably improved. Life
expectancy in Xinjiang has been extended to 71.12 years. The demography of Xinjiang shows the
features of low rate of birth, low rate of death and low rate of increase.
In 1999, the central government drew up a 10th Five-Year Plan and a development plan for the
period up to 2010. According to this plan, by 2005 the GDP of the entire region should reach 210
billion Yuan (calculated on the prices in 2000), with an annual growth rate of 9% and the GDP per
capita of over 10,000 Yuan; the investment in fixed assets should reach 420 billion Yuan. It is planned
that, by 2010, the autonomous region's GDP should be at least double that of 2000, and the popular
standard of living significantly higher .
Beijing holds fast to its policies of economic development and modernization, secularization, and
Sinification of its West as the keys to the pacification of the region. However, the prevalent perception
among Uighurs is that, in relative terms, the Chinese vision benefits few Uighurs. Southern Xinjiang's
economy, where Uighurs are concentrated, appears to be still far from being better integrated with the
relatively prosperous Northern Xinjiang economy where Han concentrate in Urumqui.
3.4 Culture and Religion
Remarkable geographical distances are key to understanding the tremendous cultural diversity of
Xinjiang existing not only among the various Muslim nationalities but also within the Uighurs as well.
The Uighurs are an ethnically Turkic group of Muslims who probably arrived in Xinjiang as part of the
great westward migration of Turkic peoples from what is now Mongolia in the eight and ninth
centuries. In addition to their collective identity as Uighurs (the name meaning “Unity”), most tend to
identify themselves by the oasis town they originate from such as Kashgar, Yarkand, Karghalik or
Turpan. Oases have maintained separate and strong local identities despite their common religion,
language and culture.
Uighurs are Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi school law placing themselves in the
mainstream tradition of Islam. Historically in Xinjiang, as well as in other parts of Central Asia, Sufism
developed although not always harmoniously. Violent raids and warfare by two rival Sufi sects
wreaked havoc in Xinjiang from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. In broad terms, Islamic life
in the oases of the South of Xinjiang, particularly in Kashgar, appears to be more conservative than in
the North.
The practice of Islam, particular in its revived form of recent years, and considering the
inseparability of religion from all aspects of Muslim life, including politics and government, has
become a symbolic means of confronting the Chinese State. By embracing Islam, Uighurs reject the
atheism of the Chinese Communist Party as well as its goals of modernization and social liberation.
Such anti-modernist feeling is however far from being universal in the province, as significant
segments of the Uighur population are keen to take growing advantage from the remarkable economic
development propitiated by the Chinese government development policies in the region.
Early PRC attempts to accommodate cultural differences have in recent years increasingly given
way to assimilation policies colliding with Uighur traditional values. Language has also become a
symbolic issue. The traditional Arabic (and Koranic) script that had been used in the region for more
than a thousand years was banned at the time of the Cultural Revolution when thousands of historical
books as well as a number of important mosques went destroyed. Arabic script has been in the past
twenty years re-introduced. However, in order to take advantage of any educational and economic
opportunities, the native population is obliged to learn Chinese. Meanwhile, few Chinese learn the local
languages. The cultural, linguistic and religious distance between the two peoples is not closing and
social interaction remains therefore negligible.
3.5 History
Uighur resistance to Han rule has a long history in Xinjiang, portions of which have also been
controlled by Arabs, Mongols, Russians, Kazakhs and Tibetans over the centuries. China's Emperors
exercised power in the region as early as 200 B.C. under the Han dynasty, but their grip on the territory
waxed and waned with the rise and fall of dynasties. The province has been described rather as “an
occupied country undergoing its sixth or seventh invasion from China in two millennia”. It has been
said that control of Xinjiang from the capital, while historically loose, has also been historically
exercised in colonial fashion by whichever faction ruled in Beijing. Uighurs established a kingdom
here in the late 8th century and controlled various areas until Genghis Khan's conquest nearly 500 years
later.
However, China paints the history of the region as one of substantial continuity and control. The
current period of Chinese control dates from the 1870s when Qing dynasty generals suppressed a
Muslim rebellion led by adventurer - and British agent - Yaqub Beg. The first systematic wave of Han
immigration reports back to that period . The province was incorporated into the Chinese empire in
1884. From 1911 to 1944, the region was dominated by rival warlords or occupied by other forces for
much of the first half of the 20th century. The Kuomintang did not establish its control of the region
after the 1911 nationalist revolution and the local Turkic elites declared an independent Eastern
Turkistan Islamic Republic. This occurred twice during the interwar period, before the Communist
revolution, out of the chaos of China's war with Japan, first in 1933 in Kashgar, and then in 1944 in the
Yili Valley with the help of Soviet agents.
As the Soviet Union drew closer to the Chinese Communists in 1948-49, the East Turkistan
Republic was dissolved. Following Mao Tse Tung's victory over the Nationalist forces in 1949,
Xinjiang was brought back into the Chinese fold through a combination of political astuteness and
military force. During the civil war, the position of the Chinese communist party was that ethnic groups
in regions such as Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang would be free to choose their own future. However,
Mao Tse Tung in 1949 in lieu of self-determination offered autonomous regions, provinces and
districts to the various ethnic groups with the promise to find in such context equality with the Chinese
majority . The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was proclaimed in 1955 but the
Communist pledge for autonomy has however only nominally been fulfilled. Ever since 1955 a
succession of non-Han leaders have chaired the regional government. In truth, real power has remained
with the Han controlled Communist Party and military. Most of the senior administrators, and all of the
military commanders in Xinjiang, are Han Chinese appointed by Beijing.
4. Episodes of Terrorism in Xinjiang
Since 2001 Chinese authorities have released reports on various aspects of alleged ongoing
terrorist activities in Xinjiang. The Uighur version of facts and episodes reported by the PRC is of
course very different. Independent verification of the claims made by either side remains impossible
due to the strict information control imposed in the region by official authorities.
A 21 January 2002 government report entitled ‘East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away
With Impunity’, compiling data from 1990 to 2001, made “East Turkistan" terrorist forces inside and
outside China responsible for over 200 terrorist incidents in Xinjiang, resulting in the deaths of 162
people of all ethnic groups, including grass-roots officials and religious personnel, and injuries to more
than 440 people. This section draws heavily from the above mentioned official document.
The report claimed that arson, explosions, assassinations and kidnappings had continued
throughout the 1990s as well as attacks on police stations, military installations and government
officials. In the Chinese view such facts are irrefutable proof of the nature of the “East Turkistan”
forces as a terrorist organization that “does not flinch from taking violent measures to kill the innocent
and harm society so as to achieve the goal of splitting the motherland”. The ‘East Turkistan Islamic
Movement’ (ETIM), one of the more extreme groups founded by Uighurs, is often quoted by the
Chinese as responsible for the acts described in the report. Out of the terrorist incidents quoted, the
following are noteworthy.
4.1 Explosions
Bomb attacks have been among the most common violent crimes in Xinjiang also due to the
wide availability of explosives for construction projects. Incidentally, this confirms the Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) as the contemporary terrorist's tactic of choice. From Xinjiang there have so
far been no reports of suicide bombings, the hallmark of contemporary Islamic radicalism.
1 “ On February 28, 1991, an explosion engineered by the ‘East Turkistan’ terrorist organization
at a video theater of a bus terminal in Kuqa County, Aksu Prefecture, Xinjiang, caused the
death of one person and injuries to 13 others.
2 On February 5, 1992, while the Chinese people were celebrating the Chinese New Year,
terrorists blew up two buses (Buses No. 52 and No. 30) in Urumqui, the regional capital of
Xinjiang, killing three people and injuring 23 others. Two other bombs they planted - one at a
cinema and the other in a residential building - were discovered before they could explode, and
defused.
3 From June 17 to September 5, 1993, ten explosions occurred at department stores, markets,
hotels and places for cultural activities in the southern part of Xinjiang, causing two deaths and
36 injuries. Among them, the June 17 explosion at the office building of an agricultural
machinery company in Kashgar, demolished the building, killed two people and injured seven
others. An explosion on August 1 at the video theater of the Foreign Trade Company in Shache
County, Kashi Prefecture, injured 15 people; on August 19 an explosion in front of the Cultural
Palace in the city of Hotan injured six people.
4 On February 25, 1997, directing its terrorist activities to the capital of Xinjiang again, the ETIM
blew up three buses (Buses No. 2, No. 10 and No. 44) in Urumqui. Nine people died and 68
others were seriously injured in the incidents, among whom were people of the ethnic Uighur,
Hui, Kyrgyz and Han origins.
5 Between February 22 and March 30, 1998, ETIM set off a succession of six explosions in
Yecheng County, Kashgar Prefecture, injuring three people and causing a natural gas pipeline
to explode and start a big fire.
6 Early in the morning of April 7, 1998, the same terrorist organization engineered eight
explosions one after another at places such as the homes of a director of the Public Security
Bureau of Yecheng County, a vice-chairman of the Yecheng County Committee of the Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and a deputy commissioner of Kashi
(Kashgar) Prefecture. The explosions injured eight people ”.
4.2 Assassinations
Chinese authorities claim also that ETIM and other terrorist groups have targeted their attacks at
officials, ordinary people and patriotic religious personages of the Uighur ethnic group, as well as the
ethnic Han people, killing them as “pagans”.
1 “On August 24, 1993, two ‘East Turkistan’ terrorists stabbed and seriously injured Abliz
Damolla, the imam of the Great Mosque.
2 On March 22, 1996, two armed and masked terrorists broke into the home of Hakimsidiq Haji,
vice-chairman of the Islamic Association of Xinhe County, Aksu Prefecture, and assistant imam
of a mosque, and shot him dead.
3 Early in the morning of April 29, 1996, a dozen ‘armed-to-the-teeth’ terrorists broke into the
homes of Qavul Toqa, deputy to the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region People’s Congress at
Qunas Village of Alaqagha Township in Kuqa County, and three other local Uighur grassroots
officials. Three of Toqa’s family died in the attack.
4 The ‘East Turkistan’ terrorist organization plotted the assassination of Arunhan Aji, executive
committee member of the Islamic Association of China and chairman of the Kashi Islamic
Association, on May 12, 1996.
5 Early in the morning of November 6, 1997, a terrorist group headed by Muhammat Tursun, at
the order of the ‘East Turkistan’ organization abroad, shot and killed Yunus Sidiq Damolla, a
member of the Islamic Association of China and of the Islamic Association of Xinjiang,
chairman of the Islamic Association of Aksu and imam of the Mosque of Baicheng County,
while he was on his way to the mosque to worship.
6 On June 4, 1997, four terrorists broke into the home of Muhammat Rozi Muhammat, an official
of Huangdi Village of Aqik Township in Moyu County, Hotan Prefecture, and killed him with
11 stab wounds.
7 On August 23, 1999, a dozen of terrorists led by Yasin Muhammat broke into the home of
Hudaberdi Tohti, political instructor of the police station of Bosikem Township in Zepu
County, Kashi Prefecture, killing Hudaberdi Tohti with 38 stab wounds and his son with a shot
to the head. Then the terrorists set Tohti’s home on fire, causing serious burns to his wife.
8 On February 3, 2001, a gang of terrorists broke into the home of Muhammatjan Yaqup, an
official at the People’s Court of Shufu County, Kashi Prefecture, killing him with 38 stab
wounds ”.
4.3 Attacks on Police and Government Institutions
According to the said government report, terrorist attacks were conducted against Police targets and
Government Institutions.
1 “On August 27, 1996, six terrorists dressed in combat fatigues drove to the office building of
the Jangilas Township People’s Government, Yecheng County, where they cut the telephone
lines and killed a deputy head of the township and a policeman on duty. Afterwards, they
kidnapped three security men and one waterworks tender in a village of the same township, and
later killed them in the desert 10 kilometers away.
2 Early in the morning of October 24, 1999, terrorists attacked the police station in Saili
Township, Zepu County, with guns, machetes, incendiary bottles and grenades. They shot one
member of a local security guard dead and wounded another, wounded a policeman and killed a
criminal suspect in custody ”.
4.4 Secret Training and Fundraising
China also claims that in order to train hardcore members and enlarge their organization, the
‘East Turkistan’ terrorist forces secretly established training bases in Xinjiang, mainly in remote parts
of the region.
1 “ In 1990, the ‘Shock Brigade of the Islamic Reformist Party’ has been said to have established
a base to train terrorists in the remote Basheriq Township, Yecheng County. Three training
classes were run there, with more than 60 terrorists having been trained, mainly in the theory of
religious extremism and terrorism, explosion, assassination and other terrorist skills, and
physical strength. Most of the trainees later participated in the major terrorist activities, such as
explosions, assassinations and robberies, from 1991 to 1993 in various parts of Xinjiang.
2 In February 1998, Hasan Mahsum, [the alleged ringleader of the ‘East Turkistan Islamic
Movement’ abroad, and since Dec.14 2003 the number 1 most wanted], sent scores of terrorists
into China. They established about a dozen training bases in Xinjiang and inland regions, and
trained more than 150 terrorists in 15 training classes. In addition, they set up large numbers of
training stations in scattered areas, each of them composed of three to five members, and some
of them being also workshops for making weapons, ammunition and explosive devices. The
Xinjiang police uncovered many of these underground training stations and workshops, and
confiscated large numbers of antitank grenades, hand-grenades, detonators, guns and
ammunition.
3 On December 30, 1999, the police discovered an underground hideout in Poskam Township,
Zepu County. In this hideout, which was 3 meters from the ground and measured 3 meters long,
2 meters wide and 1.7 meters high, they found tools for making explosive devices, such as
electric drills and electric welding machines, as well as blueprints and antitank grenades.
4 On February 25, 2000, the police arrested seven terrorists in the No. 3 Village, Kachung
Township, Shache County, and discovered a tunnel leading to an underground bunker beneath
the house of one of them, which was equipped with ventilation devices, water supply and
sewage systems. The police seized 38 antitank grenades, 22 electric detonators, 18 explosive
devices, 17 kilograms of explosive charges and more than 20 fuses from the bunker.
5 In August 2001, police discovered a four-meter-deep tunnel under the house of a terrorist in
Seriqsoghet Village, Uzun Township, Kuqa County, and confiscated 61 explosive devices from
the tunnel, which also contained various kinds of equipment for making arms and ammunition
”.
4.5 Plotting and Organizing Disturbances and Riots
In order to create an atmosphere of tension and fear, and extend its political influence, China
claims that the “East Turkistan” terrorist forces plotted and organized riots and disturbances many
times, by engaging in terrorist acts of beating, smashing, looting, arson and murder, which seriously
endangered social stability, people’s lives and property.
1 “ On April 5, 1990, a group of terrorists, aided and abetted by the "East Turkistan Islamic
Party," created a grave terrorist incident in Baren Township, Akto County, Xinjiang. They
brazenly preached a "holy war," the "elimination of pagans" and the setting up of an "East
Turkistan Republic". The terrorists tried to put pressure on the government by taking ten
persons hostage, demolished two cars at a traffic junction and killed six policemen. They shot at
the besieged government functionaries with submachine guns and pistols, and threw explosives
and hand-grenades at them”.
2 From February 5 to 8, 1997, the "East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah" and some other terrorist
organizations perpetrated the Yining Incident, a serious riot during which the terrorists shouted
slogans calling for the establishment of an "Islamic Kingdom." They attacked innocent people,
destroyed stores and burned and otherwise damaged cars and buses. During this incident seven
innocent people were killed, more than 200 people were injured, more than 30 vehicles were
damaged and two private houses were burned down. The terrorists attacked a young couple on
their way home, knifing the wife to death after disfiguring her and severely injuring the
husband. A staff member of a township cultural station was stabbed to death and then thrown
into a fire “.
3 In particular, the Baren uprising in April 1990 initiated the cycle of violence during the 1990s
and is considered a watershed episode because of the amount of weapons and explosives, and
the foreign money and backers. At Baren, 50 Uighurs and several Chinese police were killed,
starting a process of increasing radicalization. Afterwards, 1000 Uighurs were rounded up in
Xinjiang by Chinese forces, and imprisoned. Baren became a symbol of the liberation struggle.
Bombings began in 1992 in Urumqui, and continued thereafter, reaching Beijing in 1997 when
two buses were bombed.
The Beijing bombings are significant in that they marked an expansion of the violent campaign
for independence in Xinjiang.
4.6 ‘East Turkistan’ terrorist incidents outside China.
The following episodes have been quoted:
1 “ In March 1997, ‘East Turkistan’ terrorists opened fire at the Chinese embassy in Turkey, and
attacked the Chinese consulate-general in Istanbul, burning the Chinese national flag flying
there.
2 On March 5, 1998, they launched a bomb attack against the Chinese consulate-general in
Istanbul.
3 In March 2000, Nighmet Bosakof, president of the Kyrgyzstan ‘Uighur Youth Alliance’, was
shot dead in Bishkek in front of his house by members of a terrorist organization named the
‘East Turkistan Liberation Organization’ because he had refused to cooperate with them.
4 In May 2000, members of the ‘Uighur Liberation Organization’ beyond the boundaries extorted
US$100,000 as ransom after kidnapping a Xinjiang businessman, murdered his nephew, and set
the Bishkek Market of Chinese Commodities on fire.
5 On May 25, 2000, terrorists attacked the work team of the Xinjiang People’s Government
which went to Kyrgyzstan to deal with the above case, causing one death and two injuries. The
culprits then fled to Kazakhstan, killing two Kazakhstan policemen who were searching for
them in Alma-Ata in September the same year.
6 On July 1, 2002, a Chinese diplomat posted in Bishkek and his driver were reportedly
assassinated”.†[With reference to this last specific episode, it is not yet clear who was
responsible for the assassination. However, two Uighur suspects were detained by the Kyrgyz
authorities and handed over to China].
The Chinese report is impressive in its detail. However, it is also impossible to get independent
confirmation of the official version of all the facts reported. Most of the incidents occurred several
years ago and Beijing has presented limited evidence to support its claim that they were carried out by
terrorist cells taking orders from Muslim radicals abroad. Exiled Uighur activists who monitor Xinjiang
said many of the attacks that China has blamed on terrorist cells are better described as violent crimes
committed by young, frustrated Uighur men.
The Uighur version of events, as told by foreign-based propaganda organizations, is evidently very
different, describing for instance, rallies as peaceful demonstrations opposing the Chinese repression of
the Uighur identity and religion that turn ugly because of Chinese provocation and use of force.
5. The Separatists:
Organizations and Individuals
Uighur separatism represents a galaxy of uneasy scrutiny. There are nearly a hundred
organizations popping up from time to time claiming to represent different sections of the Uighurs in
Xinjiang as well as outside, and to be fighting on their behalf.† It is difficult to say whether all such
organizations exist in reality or whether many of these are merely ‘letterhead’ organizations, which
exist only on paper.† Co-ordination among the various ‘East Turkistan’ liberation groups is known to
be limited although Chinese Authorities claim there have been signs of recent consolidation.
5.1 Organisations active in Xinjiang
The organizations listed hereunder are known to be active in Xinjiang. Of these only the Eastern
Turkistan Islamic Party and the Home of East Turkistan Youth seem to be oriented towards religious
extremism and pan-Islamism.† The relative support enjoyed by these organizations amongst the local
people and their respective roles in acts of violence in Xinjiang are difficult to establish.
Some of these organizations have ideological and possibly even operational link-ups with the†
Hizb-e Tehrir (HT) or “Party of Liberation”, which projects itself as† the largest and the most popular
Central Asian Islamic movement with followings in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and† which
has been fighting to establish an Islamic Caliphate in the historical region once known as Turkistan,
encompassing the XUAR and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) .
They are also reported to have links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan which has renamed
itself since June, 2001,as the† Hizb-i-Islami Turkistan, or the Islamic Party of Turkistan, and reformulated
its objective as the creation of† an Islamic republic out of the five Central Asian Republics
and the XUAR of China.
Amongst the major terrorist/extremist organisations of Xinjiang identified so far are :
1 The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
Public enemy nr.1 according to China, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is one of the more
extreme Uighur groups. An indication that ETIM is a special concern for Chinese authorities came on
15 Dec.2003 as the PRC Ministry of Public Security issued for the first time a most wanted list of
people dubbed Eastern Turkistan terrorist comprising 11 names belonging to four separatist groups all
based abroad. ETIM was prominent in the list .
The ministry’s statement said that in past six years ETIM had set up at least 10 terrorists training
camps. It alleged that by the end of 1999 it had more than 1000 members and had amassed 5.000 antitank
grenades. The movement was accused of organizing a series of robberies and murders in Xinjiang
in 1999 which left six people dead. The ministry said the organization had received several million US
dollars from Osama Bin Laden. It also accused the group of raising money by smuggling drugs and
weapons, kidnapping, blackmailing and robbery.
Chinese characterization of ETIM as a terrorist group is however not exclusive. In 2002, the
administration of U.S. President George W. Bush froze the group's U.S. assets. On Aug. 26, 2002,
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage announced that Washington had placed the East Turkistan
Islamic Movement on the U.S. list of terrorist organizations. The group "committed acts of violence
against unarmed civilians without any regard for who was hurt," he said. Although ETIM has
traditionally focused on Chinese targets, the American administration explained that it may have had
plans to also attack American interests. The State Department said movement members attempted to
attack the U.S. embassy in Kyrgyzstan's capital, Bishkek, as well as other U.S. interests abroad. In May
2002, two members were deported to China for the plot. The group was not placed on the top priority
list of terrorist organizations but rather on the broader list of groups subject to financial sanctions.
State Department officials explained that they took a tougher line because of persuasive new
evidence that the ETIM has financial links to al-Qa’ida and has targeted American interests abroad. But
to Uighur separatist, who have felt bitterly disappointed by the shift in U.S. policy on Xinjiang, this
may have rather appeared as an obvious bid for closer relations with China which came at the time of
crucial UN Security Council negotiations over a resolution on Iraq and before Chinese President Jiang
Zemin’s scheduled October 2002 visit to President Bush’s Texas ranch.
Outside Xinjiang, ETIM cells are said to be operating in Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan and Pakistan. U.S. officials claim that the group has a ‘close financial relationship’ with al
Qa’ida, based on information they received from militants being held at the U.S. naval base in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. ETIM leader Hahsan Mahsum has denied any connections between al Qa’ida
and his group.
2 The Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (Sharki Turkistan Islam Partiyesi)
ETIP was founded in the early 1980s with the goal of establishing an independent state of Eastern
Turkistan and advocates armed struggle.† Based in the cities of Kashgar and Hoten, is supported
mainly by religious fundamentalist elements, conservative forces and some farmers.†
3 The Eastern Turkistan Revolutionary Party (Sharki Turkistan Inkalavi Partiyesi)
Based in Urumchi and Ghulja, it claims the support of† writers, progressive students and other
intellectuals.†
4 The Eastern Turkistan Independence Organization (Sharki Turkistan Azatlik Teshkilati)
Centered in Hoten, it claims the support of some young farmers, unemployed Uighurs and young
officials.† SHAT’s members have reportedly been involved in various bomb plots and shootouts.
5 The Eastern Turkistan Grey Wolf Party (Sharki Turkistan Bozkurt Partiyesi)
It used to have some following in Urumchi, and it is believed in Xinjiang that the Uighurs descended
from a wolf - hence its name.† This party, reportedly backed by teachers, students and other
intellectuals, is said to be pan- Turkic oriented.†
6 The Eastern Turkistan Liberation Front (Sharki Turkistan Azatlik Fronti)
Reportedly has a presence in the cities of Turfan and Kumul and is supported by unemployed Uighur
youth, farmers and intellectuals.†
7 The Home of East Turkistan Youth
Branded as ‘Xinjiang's Hamas’, it is a radical group committed to achieving the goal of independence
through the use of armed force. It has some 2,000 members, some of whom have undergone training in
using explosive devices in Afghanistan.
8 The Free Turkistan Movement
Led by Zahideen Yusuf, the Free Turkistan Movement is Islamic fundamentalist. The group has
claimed responsibility for organizing the Baren uprising in April 1990.
9 Islamic Holy Warriors
Led by Ujimamadi Abbas, executed in October 2003 in Hotan, it is charged with involvement in the
separatist movement since 1995 and suspected of having played a key role in the violent riots of Yining
in 1997.
10 The East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO)
ETLO is charged with crimes of arson. The Chinese authorities claim that in 1998, members of the
"East Turkistan Liberation Organization" who had infiltrated into Xinjiang after receiving special
training abroad, planned arson in some of the busiest areas of Urumqui.
5.2 Uighur organizations active outside Xinjiang
11 The Committee for Eastern Turkistan,
Based in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, is probably the most radical national movement in Central Asia. The
Committee has recently become more militant and has vowed to intensify its struggle in a bid to free
Xinjiang from growing Chinese influence. It was originally formed by Uighur guerrillas who fought
against the Chinese in the period of 1944-1949.
12 The Xinjiang Liberation Organization/Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO)
Based in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, dispersed throughout the Uyghur diaspora in Central Asia. The
ULO claims responsibility for assassinations of “Uighur collaborators” in China and Central Asia.
13 United National Revolutionary Front of East Turkistan (UNRF)
The UNRF stridently opposes Sinification of Xinjiang, and is known to assassinate imams with pro-
China views. Based in Kazakhstan and originally moderate, claims it was radicalized in 1997 as a result
of the Chinese crackdown called "Operation Strike Hard".
14 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Probably the most important Islamic organization for influencing and recruiting Uighurs within the
Central Asian Uighur diaspora. IMU's roots go back to 1991 but it was formally founded in 1996 by
the Taliban as an armed auxiliary to itself. The IMU obtained financial support and training in al
Qa’ida camps, and operated in the Ferghana Valley. Most financing comes from control of heroin and
opium trade in Central Asia. The IMU links most directly in Xinjiang with the Islamic Movement of
Eastern Turkistan, providing military and financial assistance.
The IMU changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkistan (Hezb-e Islami Turkistan) in June 2001.
The original goal of the IMU was to overthrow the Uzbek government and install an Islamic state in
Uzbekistan. When the IMU changed its name to the Islamic Party of Turkistan, its goal expanded to
creating an Islamic state for all of Central Asia and Xinjiang, which led to increased recruits of Uzbek,
Uighur, Chechen, Arab, and Pakistani members. The IMU subsequently broadened its activities beyond
Uzbekistan to attacks on surrounding countries. The total size of the IMU is estimated to be about
5,000 serving in the armed wing. The Uighur component is unknown but thought to be small.
5.3. Uighur “cyber - separatism”
Segments of the Uighur diaspora, particularly of the one settled in the Western countries, are
engaged in an advocacy action for the Uighurs’ separatist cause. Their activities are closely monitored
by China which charges that their promotion of the East Turkistan cause goes well beyond the simple
ideological support to trespass into the criminal field of terrorist abetting.
Pan-Turkic East Turkistan groups are based in Turkey, the United States and Germany. They are
active in orchestrating Uighur propaganda and – in the light of the restrictions posed by China to field
work in Xinjiang - represent a much sought, albeit biased, source of information for human rights
groups on what is happening in the province. Their activity appears to be mostly confined to web sites
and has therefore been heralded as a vocal but relatively un-effective ‘cyber–separatism’. Such groups
include:
1 The East Turkistan Information Center
ETIC runs a prominent Germany-based English-language news web site on Uighur affairs. China has
accused ETIC of secretly sending information on how to conduct violent terrorist activities back to a
network within the Chinese border, and claimed it was using its information role as a facade for these
activities.
2 The World Uighur Youth Congress (WUYC).
Chaired by Mehmet Toti, the organization comprises young people of Uighur origin from different
countries of the world. They are known for having arranged a World Uighur Youth Congress in the
Estonian capital of Tallinn in November 2000 as part of the conflict prevention conference organized
by the Unrepresented Peoples and Nations Organization (UNPO). They have been vocal in advocating
the attention of international organizations, particularly UNESCO, in the prevention of the destruction
of Uighur historic sites.
3 The East Turkistan National Congress
Presided over by Enver Can, it claims to be the only legitimate umbrella body of the Uighur people
abroad and the representative organ of the Uighur people to speak and act on behalf of that people in
the free world. It includes 18 organizations legally operating in 13 countries around the world. It claims
to abhor violence of terrorism as an instrument of policy and declares its unconditional adherence to the
internationally accepted human rights standards as laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and International Covenant and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
adherence to the principles of democratic pluralism and rejection of totalitarianism and any form of
religious intolerance.
The first General Assembly, or National Congress, of the ETNC was held in 1992 in Istanbul. At the
second General Assembly, held in Munich in 1999, the East Turkistan National Congress was founded
as the international democratically elected representative body of the Uighur people.
4 The Uighur American Association (UAA)
The Uighur American Association renounces the use of violence to achieve political ends. The UAA
claims that Beijing's military approach to terrorism in Xinjiang is state terrorism, and is burying the
seeds for future violence among young Uighurs. As a lobbying group in the US, UAA has encouraged
the American public and government to think of the Uighurs with the same amount of sympathy they
accord Tibetans and others.
5.4 Most Wanted
On 15 Dec.2003 as the PRC Ministry of Public Security issued for the first time a most wanted list
of people dubbed ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorists’. The list comprised eleven names belonging to four
separatist groups all based abroad :
Hasan Mahsum,39
Topping the list is the alleged leader of ETIM. According to the profile released by the Chinese
authorities, Mahsum was a founder of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. He was born in 1964 in
Xinjiang and was a first time arrested in 1993 for terrorist activities. After serving a three-year labour
re-education sentence, he went abroad in 1997 and founded the organisation.
Muhanmetemin Hazret, 53
Thought to be the leader of ETLO. The Group is accused of bombings and killings including the 2002
murder of a Chinese diplomat in Kyrgyzstan.
Dolqun Isa, 36
Thought to be the Deputy ETLO leader. Accused of masterminding explosions in Hotan.
Abudejelili Kalakash, 43
Leader of East Turkistan Information centre (ETIC) and member of the World Uighur Youth Congress.
Crimes said to include sending activist information via the Internet on making poisons and explosives.
The following individuals have also been charged with planning of terrorist acts, organizing
terrorists training abroad, weapons smuggling arson, killings and making explosives.
1 Abudukadir Yapuquan, 45
2 Abudumijit Muhammatkelim, 36
3 Adudula Kiaji, 34
4 Abulimit Turxun, 39
5 Hudaberdi Haxerbik, 33
6 Yasen Muhammat, 39
7 Atahan Abuduhani, 39
It is perhaps useful to include here the names of Uighur individuals apprehended and executed by
China. Their deaths at the hand of the Chinese has somewhat elevated them to a state of “martyrs” and
their example may therefore be present in the minds of other would be radicals.
Zahideen Yusuf
Leader of the Free Turkistan Movement is deemed to have been the force behind the Baren riots
of April 1990. The episode initiated a process of increasing radicalization of Uighurs. Yusuf is thought
to have smuggled and stockpiled weapons and to have been spreading the message of jihad beforehand.
Zahideen was killed in Baren. However, his memory is still nourished in the popular lore.
Ujimamadi Abbas
Executed in October 2003 in Hotan he was the leader of the militant group ‘Islamic Holy
Warriors’. According to Chinese charges, he had been involved in the separatist movement since 1995
and had played a key role in the violent riots of Yining in 1997. Abbas had sought refuge in Nepal in
2000 but was repatriated in 2002, under Chinese pressure, by the Nepalese authorities.
Uighur propaganda portrays Abbas as a peaceful political activist who nonviolently resisted
Chinese rule in East Turkistan. Uighurs have blamed the Nepali government for extraditing Abbas to
China in violation of the international law principle of non-refoulement and disregarding the refugee
status that had been granted to him by UNHCR officials in Nepal.
6. China’s counter- terrorist strategy: repression and diplomacy
As China perceives rising tide of terrorism and separatist movements within its own borders,
the PRC government has adopted a bi- dimensional approach in dealing with the issue . The first
dimension deals with prevention. This involves ad hoc domestic legislation and sweeping action on
terrorist activities by the law enforcement agencies. The second dimension concerns with isolating and
demonizing the separatist groups. This is done by a combination of domestic efforts to co-opt
“assimilated Uighurs” , and of diplomatic action aiming at isolating separatists by undercutting
whatever international support they can muster.
The crack down on Uighur separatism is in Xinjiang known as “Strike Hard! Maximum
Pressure!”. Such law-enforcement campaign is part and parcel of a wider national ‘Strike Hard’ highprofile
police initiative launched in 1996, as an answer to citizens' legitimate concerns about rising
crime. The ‘Strike Hard’ campaign never officially came to an end, though it has faded from the scene
in most urban areas. In minority areas, particularly in Xinjiang province, the ‘Strike Hard’ campaign
has continued in 2002 and 2003, and includes harsh measures against political activists.
6.1 Domestic measures
In the wake of the Sept.11 attacks, Chinese authorities undertook a number of measures to
improve China’s counterterrorism posture and domestic security.† These included increasing its
vigilance in Xinjiang and increasing the readiness levels of its military and police units in the region.†
China also bolstered Chinese regular army units near the borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to
block terrorists fleeing from Afghanistan, while strengthening overall domestic preparedness.† At the
request of the United States, China conducted a search within Chinese banks for evidence to attack
terrorist financing mechanisms. Despite the current ongoing stabilization of Afghanistan under the
government of Hamid Karzai, military vigilance at the eastern tip of the Wakhan corridor, the stretch of
mountainous territory that provides Afghanistan with a border with China, remains high.
Chinese Authorities also felt the need to upgrade criminal legislative provisions with the
specific aim of targeting terrorism-related crimes. On 29 December 2001, the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress (NPC - China's legislature) adopted amendments to the Criminal Law
of the People's Republic of China. The stated purpose of the amendments, which entered into force the
same day, was to ‘punish terrorist crimes, ensure national security and the safety of people's lives and
property, and uphold social order’.
However, human rights group are concerned that the new provisions enlarge the scope of
application of the death penalty in China and may be used to further suppress freedom of expression
and association. Human rights activists are concerned that the new provisions introduced on ‘terrorist’
crimes, enlarge the scope of the death penalty, and that both the new and existing provisions on such
crimes are vaguely worded and may criminalize peaceful activities and infringe unduly upon rights
such as freedom of expression and association.
As far as the responsibilities of the law-enforcement agencies are concerned, China’s 2002
White Paper on national defense identified the fight against terrorism as one of the major peacetime
tasks of the paramilitary People's Armed Police (PAP). The Paper stated that specific anti-terror
missions of the PAP included “performing anti-attack, anti-hijacking and anti-explosion tasks”. This
appears to be an enlargement of the PAP traditional mandate, as the force, established in 1982, has in
the past primarily been charged with guard duties and internal security.
It is worth recalling the specific anti-terrorist activity carried out in Xinjiang by the pseudomilitary
Bin Tuan organization, formally known as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
(XPCC). The Bin Tuan was formed in the 1950s when Chinese troops were relieved of combat duties
and drafted into agricultural development projects. It was disbanded in 1975 but re-established in 1981
and retains a somewhat misleading military designation as the Xth Agricultural Division. The XPCC
numbers about 2.28 million people, including about 1 million workers. Despite its alleged non-combat
status, the XPCC has served as an effective arm of the PLA in countering unrest in Xinjiang over the
years and played a key role in ending the 1990 Baren uprising. Among the overall XPCC
responsibilities are management of the Chinese detention camps.
6.2 China’s anti-terror diplomacy
It is widely held that Sept.11 marked a watershed in the anti-terrorism postures and policies of
states worldwide. China's initial response to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC was
one of deep shock, sincere sympathy, and condolences. Chinese officials strongly condemned the
September 11 attacks and announced China would strengthen cooperation with the international
community in fighting terrorism on the basis of the UN Charter and international law.† China voted in
support of UN Security Council resolutions after the attack.† Its vote for Resolution 1368 on
Afghanistan marked the first time it has voted in favor of authorizing the international use of force.†
China and the United States began a counterterrorism dialogue in late-September 2001, which
was followed by further discussions during, the State Department's Counter-Terrorism Coordinator,
Ambassador Francis Taylor, trip in December 2001 to Beijing.† The profile of US-Sino anti-terrorism
co-operation was raised with the Government of China approving the establishment of an FBI Legal
Attaché in Beijing and agreeing to create US-China counterterrorism working groups on financing and
law enforcement. Sino-American co-operation was extended and pursued with increasing intensity and
manifest satisfaction on the U.S. part.
The PRC has typically sought international cooperation in preventing terrorist organizations in
Islamic countries from providing support to separatist groups operating within China. Beijing has
reached out to states in the region suspected of providing havens for terrorist organizations. For
instance, China maintains a close relationship with Pakistan, a country whose role in the war on terror
is sometimes seen as ambivalent.
China has taken a constructive approach to terrorism problems in South and Central Asia,
publicly supporting the American–led coalition campaign in Afghanistan and using its influence with
Pakistan to urge support for multinational efforts against the Taliban and al Qa’ida.† Similarly, Beijing
is believed to have pressured Pakistan to crack down on Muslim groups it suspects of arming
fundamentalists in Xinjiang. The PRC special relationship with Pakistan has not refrained the Chinese
government from taking action against the possible spread of Islamic fundamentalism at the hands of
Pakistanis in Xinjiang. According to journalistic reports in late December 2003, 700 Pakistani traders
were expelled from Xinjiang. Beijing has also restricted visas for Pakistanis wanting to travel to
Xinjiang along the Karakorum Highway and taken measures to prevent Muslim Uighurs from traveling
to Pakistan and Afghanistan to attend Islamic madrassas (religious schools).
Moreover, Beijing has been particularly interested in developing ties with the authorities in
neighboring states to restrict the operations of Islamic separatist groups who maintain the independence
campaign safe from Chinese intervention.
6.3 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
China has in particular, sought closer cooperation with the governments of the Central Asian
Republics. Anti-terrorism has increasingly become a major focus of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) that includes China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The
organization was born in 1996 as the ‘Shanghai Group’ comprising Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan,
Kazakhstan, Russia and China and was formed in part in an effort to overcome lingering suspicions
between Beijing and its ex-Soviet neighbors, to create a more stable border area, and promote intraregional
progress through trust and co-operation.
After a five-year embryonic phase, the post 9/11 scenario, substantially revolutionized by
American political and military influence in the region, provided the urge for an upgrade of cooperation
among the partners of the organization and for the institutionalization of collective
mechanisms. A Charter was signed in June 2001 as well as a declaration and an agreement on
terrorism, separatism and extremism. The Charter has come into effect in September 2003, following
ratification by four countries.
Permanent bodies have been created: a Secretariat was inaugurated in Beijing on January 15
2004 and an anti-terrorist institution in Tashkent is expected to be opened within June 2004
(Uzbekistan joined SCO in 2001). Such body had been originally planned to be hosted by Tajikistan in
its capital Bishkek, but Tashkent was eventually chosen to accommodate Uzbekistan’s status and for
symbolic reasons, as that country feels that it is the primary target of terrorist activities in Central Asia
(particularly by the IMU) .
Although the organization aims at developing an equally strong articulate “second track”
mainly covering economy and trade, security is bound to be one of the main components of the SCO.
Anti-terrorist and military exercises were conducted in the summer of 2003. Named “Cooperation
2003”, the anti-terrorist exercise saw more than 1,000 soldiers from Russia, Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan launch a mock battle to rescue air passengers held by a gang of international terrorists.
In a second stage of the exercise on August 11-12, Chinese forces in Xinjiang practiced
hostage-release techniques and the destruction of a terrorist base. The drills were the first of their kind
within the framework of the SCO, and the first time the PLA had taken part in such a large - scale joint
anti-terrorism exercise . While the Chinese stress that the SCO is not a military alliance and does not
target any third country, the organization is “both responsible and effective in making contributions to
the international anti-terrorism campaign”, and as such, proved to be a critical part of Chinese efforts to
stem and eradicate external links to domestic separatist and terrorist cells.
7. Xinjiang : radical Islam’s next tinderbox?
Muslim communities are found in almost every part of China from Guangdong and Fujian
where Muslim sailors and merchants first came ashore to the far north-eastern provinces of Liaoning
and Heilongjiang. However, the deepest impression left by Islam has been in the remote North-West,
along the Silk Road. According to the 1999 census, China has more than 17 million Muslims. The Hui,
ethnically and linguistically of Chinese stock, are the largest officially recognised Muslim group at
about 8.6 million. Hui minority populations are found throughout China and they do not have a
traditional territorial homeland. There are however, significant concentrations of Hui in their own
autonomous region, Ningxia, as well as in Gansu and Qinghai provinces, which lie to the east of
Xinjiang in central China. Conversely, Turkic Islam in China is however, clearly associated with the
territory of Xinjiang where the native Uighur population practices a moderate form of Sunnism
veneered by Sufism.
The challenge to state authority posed by Islam’s blurring of the lines between the spiritual and
the secular is well known and has determined in China as elsewhere, areas of conflict between the
Chinese State and its Muslim citizens. Such conflict is at its most intense when religion is laced with
nationalism. This is precisely the combination most feared by the government in Beijing.
To address such challenge the PRC has systematically sought to manage and control religious
activities throughout China, ostensibly to safeguard national unity and stability. Religious practice has
been put under vigilance in the XUAR, as in other parts of China, since the 1950s. The Cultural
Revolution was particularly hard for all religious groups in China, Christians, Buddhists and Muslims.
In Xinjiang and throughout China, mosques were destroyed or closed and ancient religious sites
desecrated. After Deng Xiao Ping took power, the situation improved rapidly for the Muslims.
Mosques were rebuilt or reopened and greater interaction between China's Muslims and the wider
Islamic community was permitted.
However, in the late 1980s and the 1990s, in sync with the growing separatism menace, the
Chinese government responded by restricting contacts between its Turkic Muslims and visitors from
the Middle East. By the early 1990s, mosque construction and renovation was curtailed, public
broadcasting of sermons outside mosques was banned, and religious education was proscribed. Only
religious material published by the state Religious Affairs Bureau was allowed, religious activists were
purged from state positions and Haj pilgrimages were tightly controlled and limited to participants over
50 years of age. Despite such measures, Chinese Muslim participation in the annual Haj pilgrimage to
Mecca grew steadily from the mid-1980s, exposing many ordinary people to international Islamic
thought and political developments. Similarly, foreign Muslims were allowed to visit Islamic sites in
China, creating a greater awareness of the wider Muslim community. Uighur participation in the
Islamic vision of a Muslim Central Asia was strengthened when the Karakorum Highway, linking
Pakistan to China, was opened in 1986. Since then the route of the Haj - an obligation for devout
Muslims - would always include a stop-over in Pakistani religious schools (deenie madaress [ar.]) on
the way to Saudi Arabia. In this manner, thousands of Uighurs developed connections with Pakistani
religious schools and organizations.
The first serious outbreaks of violence directed at the Chinese authorities occurred in the 1990s
in response to the imposition of the above described restrictive measures and reflected the local
communities' anger and frustration at Beijing's about-turn on greater religious freedom. Chinese control
has intensified in the XUAR since October 2001. Today China sees Islam’s revival in Xinjiang, part of
a wider Islamic revival in Central Asia, as the chief obstacle to Uighur assimilation and to
modernization of the region. However, while there is a growing conservatism in the province external
observers feel that it is not the Taliban style of Wahabbi Islam that the Chinese government seems to be
afraid of. Moreover, the indigenous Sufi tradition appears to be a spiritual obstacle to the spread of
unbridled fundamentalism. It has been observed for centuries that Sufism, a form of Islamic mysticism
preaching direct communion with God, has been the most tolerant expression of Islam incorporating
Buddhist, Shaman and even Christian beliefs .
Possibly because of Sufism, a major influx of radical Islam has not yet encroached on the
mainstream Uighur population. There are therefore few indications that Xinjiang will become a hotbed
of Islamic radicalism or even a haven for al Qa’ida. Among the Uighurs, few have any sympathy for
the fundamentalist society of a Taliban type. Music and alcohol are not unfamiliar in Uighur areas, and
women aren't sequestered (purdah) as in many other Muslim societies. Furthermore, independent
observers and experts point out that Uighur identification with Islam and their religious practices are
based primarily on ethnic identity and cultural heritage, and have little in common with the forms of
Islam preached by Wahabbi schools in some countries. Direct contact between Xinjiang and Saudi
Arabia (where 10.000 Uighurs are thought to be living) has been limited. Before Beijing tightened the
reins on the area, it has been reckoned that only about 6,000 Uighurs a year ever went on the Hajj
pilgrimage - an obligation for devout Muslims - compared to some 30,000 from Malaysia, a Muslim
country similar in population size to Xinjiang.
Rather hypothetical is also a possible Uighur-Hui connection as the Hui and the Turkic Muslims
have different relationships with the Han Chinese and the two groups are not natural allies. The former
are frequently referred to as "Chinese Muslims" and are culturally closer to the mainstream Chinese
community. The Hui have no inherent connection with the Turkic-origin Islamic groups but have often
served as a bridge between them and Beijing. The Hui lack the sense of group identity that sustains the
Uighur separatist movement and have not been implicated in anti-Chinese violence in Xinjiang.
Does the above rule out all possibility of Xinjiang turning into another Ferghana Valley, the
Central Asia hotbed of Islamic radicalism? Not entirely. The Chinese authorities have the not so
unreasonable concern that due to a presumed – although not entirely proved - connection between
veterans of the Afghan war and separatists in Xinjiang, that the independence movement is being
armed and influenced by outside powers. The Afghan war should not be underestimated in terms of the
impact it has had on disaffected Islamic youth. As an ideological event, the Afghan conflict clearly had
a powerful effect on those who now seek to create an Islamic state in East Turkistan. A number of
Xinjiang Muslims are known to have trained and fought alongside the Mujahideen in Afghanistan
together with other committed revolutionaries from a number of Islamic states.
It is therefore plausible that some of the Xinjiang Muslims who fought in Afghanistan have
returned to take up arms against the Chinese. Certainly, radical Islamic international contacts were
consolidated in Afghanistan and the end of that conflict has created a pool of well-trained, religiously
motivated, fighters and a vast amount of surplus weapons. There is a virtually uncontrollable trade in
weapons from Afghanistan to the border regions of Pakistan, Kashmir, Tajikistan and to criminal
elements elsewhere in the region. Smuggling of all kinds of contraband is endemic throughout the area
and centuries-old tribal connections make it unreasonable to dismiss the influence of “outsiders” in the
Xinjiang conflict.
It therefore remains to be proved that the separatist movement in Xinjiang is being managed or
manipulated by foreigners. As far as clues of a possible radicalization are concerned, many Uighurs
have for instance, little knowledge of what has been the litmus test of Muslim zealotry, the Palestinian
issue. Moreover, while in all the statements that have attributed to bin Laden since 9/11 he has
repeatedly tried to rally Muslims by mentioning the injustices done to Muslims in places like
Palestinian territories, Chechnya and Iraq, he has never mentioned East Turkistan.
In short, whereas there has clearly been a growing awareness of their ethno-religious roots
amongst the Muslims of Xinjiang in recent years, it is not apparent that this can be equated with the
beginning of an Islamic fundamentalist movement. The increase in Muslim unrest in Xinjiang indicates
that the roots of widespread discontent and unrest among Uighurs, appear to lie in current socioeconomic
inequalities rather than in the influence of foreign Islamist movements .
7.1 Conclusion
Although the word “terrorism” is used frequently and its practice is generally opposed, there is
no universally accepted definition in general use or in treaties and laws designed to combat it. States
and commentators describe as “terrorist” acts or political motivations that they oppose, while rejecting
the use of the term when it relates to activities or causes they support. This is commonly put as “one
person's terrorist is another person's freedom fighter” (Reagan).
In a recent report, the UN Special Rapporteur on terrorism noted that the issue of “terrorism”
has been “approached from such different perspectives and in such different contexts that it has been
impossible for the international community to arrive at a generally acceptable definition to this very
day”. The Special Rapporteur also pointed out that ''the term terrorism is emotive and highly loaded
politically. It is habitually accompanied by an implicit negative judgment and is used selectively”.
Recent attempts to finalize the UN Convention on ‘terrorism’ have stalled, inter alia, owing to
disagreements about the definition.
Beijing's framing of Muslim unrest in Xinjiang as “terrorism” appears to be a case in point as
radically divergent interpretations of the current Uighur struggle are given by the Chinese government
and by the Uighurs themselves.
However framed, I would argue that such unrest has been until now motivated less by Islamic
fundamentalism than secular demands. At the same time this could change as -with the exception of the
moral support provided by international human rights activists - Islamist groups appear to provide the
only allies that the Uighurs can count on. Shunted by their historically traditional patrons (firstly
Russia), Uighurs have been keenly disappointed by America eagerness for Chinese support in their
anti-terror drive. Moreover, the military action in Iraq by the United States and Britain has spent the
little political capital left and enjoyed in Xinjiang by America, as that action has generated fierce
hostility. It is no therefore surprise that Uighurs would now look at the Islamic ummah as a provider of
support, both material and moral, to the separatist quest. This could increase in the future as the
Uighurs’ sense of despair becomes more acute.
Until now claims that Xinjiang separatist groups, including the ETIM, significantly threaten
Chinese control of the region appear not entirely convincing; such groups are simply too small,
scarcely coordinated and dispersed to wage an organized campaign. It has been observed that although
there are periodic riots, infrequent bus bombings and frequent fistfights between Uighurs and Hans,
resistance against Chinese government control is generally passive.
One important outcome of the ongoing crisis in Xinjiang is China's Muslims growing
significance to China's internal and international relations. This is bound to affect Beijing’s relations
with key countries in the Middle East. Chinese ties to countries like Iran, Iraq, and Libya have been
driven by a host of geo-strategic, energy, commercial, and foreign policy considerations.
Unrest in Xinjiang stems from the concurring effects of cultural/religious policing and
demographic alteration. Beijing's attempts to Sinify the region through the strict control of religion,
assembly and language, as well as through the encouragement of Han Chinese settlements in the
region, have fomented anti-régime sentiment.
The perception that the evident economic development of the region has been unequally
benefiting Hans and Uighurs breeds per se hostility. Beijing’s challenges in Xinjiang stem from its
difficulty – critics say unwillingness - to redress such inequality and to address the basic aspirations of
national minorities such as the Uighurs.
At the end of the day the root causes of terrorism in Central Asia - and to large extent also in
Xinjiang - are poverty and backwardness. The best long-term policies are therefore poverty reduction
strategies. On this account the People’s Republic of China policy of economic development of Xinjiang
represents a positive strategic course and an opportunity. In Xinjiang the People’s Republic of China
has scored remarkable albeit uneven success in overcoming the region’s economic and cultural
backwardness. However, it has so far done that by privileging a top-down approach to the economic
development of the region’s resources.
A segment of local population, the so called “assimilated” Uighurs, has been increasingly
recognizing the necessity of embracing and adapting to the Han driven socio-economic change. While
some Uighurs seek full independence, assimilated Uighurs may simply content themselves with greater
autonomy and better protection. However, they risk to remain caught between the local ethnic
extremism of the separatist fringes and the Han settlers’ prejudices.
As noted in this paper, Xinjiang has so far been spared the tragic hallmark of terrorism by Islamic
fanatics - suicide bombing. However, disruption of the traditional transmission of Uighur culture risks
to create a class of young men all too available for mobilization by Islamic fanatics. Among them, the
high rate of unemployment and the feeling of extreme alienation - if not outright despair – may make
young Uighur men receptive to recruitment by groups of violent Islamic fanatics. Moreover, according
to some analysts, the combustible political situation combines today with the circumstance that the
region is the second most HIV/AIDS infected in China. As the local healthcare system appears to be
failing to adequately care for them – with the Uighurs perceiving as deliberate the central government’s
lack of response to AIDS - it has been argued that the situation could soon provide a lethal hotbed for
the recruit of suicide bombers . The involvement of female suicide bombers in April 2004 terrorist
attacks in Uzbekistan – an absolute first in Central Asia - rings therefore an ominous alarm bell .
With Beijing's management of the situation in Xinjiang having profound ramifications for the
domestic, regional and international security, the so called “fourth generation” of the Chinese
leadership is called to important decisions in the context of the international war on terror.
7.2. Sources
Bibliography:
On Xinjiang:
1 G. Fuller- S. Frederick Starr, “The Xinjiang Problem”, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, Paul H.
Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University , Washington
2003
2 Tyler Christian, “Wild West China: The Taming of Xinjiang”, London 2003
3 “Guide to Xinjiang”, Hong Kong Tourism Press 2001
4 Dillon Michael, “Central Asia: the View from Beijing, Urumqui and Kashghar", in Security
Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt , London 1997
5 Dillon Michael, “Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflict on China's Northwestern Borders: the
Background to the Violence in Xinjiang”, Boundary and Security Bulletin Vol 5 No 1 Spring
1997
6 Dillon Michael, “Chinese Muslims and Religious and Ethnic Conflict in North-West China”,
China Study Journal Vol 9 No 1 April 1994
7 Dillon Michael, “Xinjiang: Ethnicity, Separatism and Control in Chinese Central Asia”,
Durham East Asia Papers No 1 January 1995
8 Dreyer T. June, “The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region at Thirty: a Report Card”, Asian
Survey vol XXVI no. 7 July 1986
9 MacMillen Donald H., “Xinjiang and the Production and Construction Corps: a Han
Organization in a Non Han Region”, Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs No. 6
10 Rackza Witt, “Xinjiang and its Central Asian Borderlands”, Central Asian Survey vol 17 n.3
11 Rudelson Justin Jon, “Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along the Silk Road” New York
1997
12 Quesnel Remi, “Wang Lixiong, Un Intellectuel Atypique,” Perspective Chinoises, nr.79,
Sept.Oct.2003
13 Wang David G., “Clouds over Tianshan. Essays On Social Disturbance in Xinjiang in the
1940s”, Copenhagen 1999
14 “Xinjiang Today”, New World Press, Beijing 1988
15 “Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region” in: “Modern China”, Graham Hutchings, Penguin
Books, London 2001
On China
1 Benewick Robert and Donald Stephanie, “The State of China Atlas”, London 1999
2 Yabuki S. and Harner S.M, “China’s New Political Economy,” Oxford 1999
3 “China’s Minority Nationalities”, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing 1989
4 “China’s Great Leap West”, Tibet Information Network, London 2000
5 World Bank (the), “China 2020 Development challenges in the new century”, Washington 1997
6 MacKerras C. and McMillen D. H. (eds.), “Dictionary of the Politics of the People’s Republic
of China”, London 2001
7 Starr J. B., “Understanding China”, London 2001
On Chinese Muslims
1 Dillon Michael, “China’s Muslims,” Oxford 1996
2 Dillon Michael, “Muslims in China”, in The Muslim Almanac: History, Cultures and Peoples of
Islam, Detroit 1995
3 Dillon Michael, “Muslim Communities in Contemporary China: The Resurgence of Islam After
the Cultural Revolution”, Journal of Islamic Studies Vol 5 No 1 January 1994
4 Dillon Michael, “Muslims in Post-Mao China”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs Vol 16 No
1 1996
5 Dreyer T. June, “China’s Forty Millions”, Cambridge MA 1976
6 Gladney Dru C., “Ethnic Identity in China. The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality”,
Orlando 1998
7 Gladney Dru C., “Muslim Chinese. Ethnic nationalism in the People’s Republic”, Cambridge
MA 1996
8 Lipman Jonathan N., ”Familiar Strangers. A History of Muslims in Northwest China”,
Washington 1997
9 Rech Ernesto, “L’Islam nella Cina Attuale”, Cina Ismeo, Rome 1957
10 Safran William (ed), “Nationalism and Ethnoregional Identities in China, London 1998
On Central Asia
1 Rashid Ahmed, “Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia”, Yale 2002
2 Rashid Ahmed, “Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia”, I.B. Tauris,
London 2000
3 Rashid Ahmed, “The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam Or Nationalism?”, Oxford University
Press, Karachi 1994
4 Kenneth Weisbrode, “ Central Asia: Prize or Quicksand” ,London 2001
5 Roy Olivier, “La Nouvelle Asie Centrale”, Paris 1997
6 Bertsch Gary K., Craft Cassady, Jones Scott A. and Beck Michael (eds), “Crossroads and
Conflict. Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia”. London 2000
7 M. Holt Ruffin and Daniel Waugh, “Civil Society In Central Asia”, Center for Civil Society
International 1999
8 “Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and Dialogue In The Heart of Central Asia,
Center For Preventive Action New York, 1999
9 Kulchik Y., Fadin A. and Sergeev V., “Central Asia After the Empire”, London 1996
On energy issues
1 “The Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st Century, CSIS Strategic Energy Initiative, Washington
2000
2 Ebel Robert and Menon Rajan (eds), “Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
Oxford 2000
On Islam in Central Asia:
1 Botiveau Berbard and Cesari Jocelyn, “Geopolitique des Islams”, Paris 1997
2 Esposito J. L., “The Oxford History of Islam“, Oxford 1999
3 Lacoste Y. (ed), “Dictionnaire de Geopolitique”, Paris 1993
4 Lapidus Ira M.” Storia delle Societ‡ Islamiche”, Turin 2000
5 Rahul R., “China, Russia and Central Asia, “New Delhi 1995
Reports, articles and other documents
1 China’s first White Paper on Xinjiang, issued by the Information Office of the State Council
issued a white paper on 26.5.2003 http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-
05/26/content_887198.htm
2 "Patterns of Global Terrorism" report, released April 2003 by the U.S. Secretary of State and
the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2002/
3 The War on Terrorism: China's Opportunities and Dilemmas" by Jing-dong Yuan, Monterey
Institute of International Studies, September 25, 2001:
http://cns.miis.edu/research/wtc01/china.htm
4 Radical Islamization In Xinjiang – Lessons From Chechnya? “ by Matthew Oresman and
Daniel Steingart Central Asia –Caucasus Analyst Wednesday/July 30, 2003:
http://csis.org/china/030605.cfm
5 “HIV/AIDS As a Regional Security Threat”, by Justin. J. Rudelson, paper presented at the
forum organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The Role of Xinjiang in
China-Central Asia Relations”, Washington D.C. 5 June 2003.
http://csis.org/china/030605.cfm
6 “Forum 18”, Survey of religious freedom in Xinjiang, Oslo, 23 September 2003:
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=143
7 Center for Defense Information (CDI), Terrorism Project: "In the Spotlight: East Turkistan
Islamic Movement (ETIM)", 9 Dec.2002, http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/etim.cfm
8 Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (RFERL), Paul Goble, 5 June 2001, " Russia: Analysis From
Washington -- Another Islamic Threat In Inner Asia?",
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/06/05062001102225.asp
9 Federation of American Scientists (FAS),John Pike, 5 Dec.1999, "Uighur Militants Committee
for Eastern Turkistan", http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/uighur.htm
10 Amnesty International Report on the People's Republic of China, 22 march 2002 "China's antiterrorism
legislation and repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region",:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engASA170102002?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES%
5CCHINA?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES%5CCHINA
11 Center for Contemporary Conflict, Strategic Insight, by Gaye Christoffersen, 2 Sept.2002
Constituting the Uyghur in U.S.-China Relations: The Geopolitics of Identity Formation in the
War on Terrorism, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/rsepResources/si/sept02/eastAsia.asp
12 South Asia Analysis Group, by B. Raman, 24. 07. 2002: US & “TERRORISM IN
XINJIANG”, http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper499.html
13 World Socialist Web Site, By John Chan, 8 August 2002 “China’s "War on Terrorism"—
Brutal Repression Of Ethnic Unrest in Xinjiang”,
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/aug2002/chin-a08.shtml
14 Washingtonpost.com "In China's West, Ethnic Strife Becomes 'Terrorism'" By Philip P. Pan,
Washington Post Foreign Service Monday, July 15, 2002; Page A12
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A42152002Jul14?language=printer
15 Speech of Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor,
Xinjiang University, Urumqui, China, December 19, 2002 ,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/16222.htm
16 Asia Times, “China Intensifies Its 'Terror' Crackdown, by Antoaneta Bezlova, 15 Nov. 2001,
http://www.atimes.com/china/CK15Ad01.html
17 Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (RFERL), China: Beijing Cracking Down On Uighur
Muslims, by Bruce Pannier, 18 Oct.2001,
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/10/18102001074432.asp
18 “Canadian Security Intelligence Service ,Islamic Unrest in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region”, by Dr. Paul George, Spring 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/com73e.htm
19 AFP, 09/12/2002, "Terrorism Emerges as Major Security Threat in Chinese White Paper":
http://coranet.radicalparty.org/pressreview/print_right.php?func=detail&par=3825
20 Uyghur -American Association: http://www.caccp.org/et/ www.taklamakan.org
21 East Turkistan Information Center, http://www.uygur.org/english.htm
22 “Cyber-separatism and Uyghur Ethnic Nationalism in China”, Dru. C. Gladney, paper
presented at the forum organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “The
Role of Xinjiang in China-Central Asia Relations”, Washington D.C. 5 June 2003.
http://csis.org/china/030605.cfm
23 Uighurs Need Not Apply" by Bruce Gilley, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 August 200
24 “Burying Seeds for Violence- Xinjiang" by Ruth Ingram, The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst,
21 November 2001
25 “Islamic Extremism in Xinjiang - an overstated case ?" by Kate Westgarth, in China Review
(Great Britain-China Centre), Spring 2002, pp.10-11
26 “The Economic Motivations of Xinjiang Wahabism" by Felix Chang, The Central Asia-
Caucasus Analyst, 13 February 2002.
27 Rashid Ahmed, “Unstable Fringe”, Far Eastern Economic Review 9 Sept. 1999
28 Rashid Ahmed and Lawrence S.V. , “Joining Foreign Jihad, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7
Sept. 2000
29 Starr Frederick, “Making Eurasia Stable”, Foreign Affairs 75/1-1996.
Tengri alemlerni yaratqanda, biz uyghurlarni NURDIN apiride qilghan, Turan ziminlirigha hökümdarliq qilishqa buyrighan.Yer yüzidiki eng güzel we eng bay zimin bilen bizni tartuqlap, millitimizni hoquq we mal-dunyada riziqlandurghan.Hökümdarlirimiz uning iradisidin yüz örigechke sheherlirimiz qum astigha, seltenitimiz tarixqa kömülüp ketti.Uning yene bir pilani bar.U bizni paklawatidu,Uyghurlar yoqalmastur!
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